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The Law of Agency and the
National Union
By RoGER K. EvANs*
Any deterrent theory for imposing liability on one person for
the acts of another is based on the premise that only those who
are in a position of control should be held liable for the unlawful
conduct of others. In applying this theory to conduct within the
American labor organization the courts consider both whether
the national union has actual control over the conduct of one of
its subordinate organizations and also whether the imposition of
liability for the conduct of the local might encourage the develop-
ment of responsible national union conduct. The difficulty of
attempting to achieve a balance between union responsibility
and union power by this latter means is reflected in the history
of the law of agency in the field of American labor law.
During the nineteenth and the early part of the twentieth
centuries some courts employed theories of proximate cause, con-
spiracy, and agency to hold the union liable for the acts of its
officers and members. The proximate cause theory which related
an act to its foreseeable consequences, coupled with a presump-
tion that violence was a foreseeable consequence of any author-
ized strike, was used to hold the union liable for any unlawful
conduct by its members during the strike.' The conspiracy doc-
trine was used to hold unions "responsible not for acts of agents
who had authority to act, but for every act committed by any
member of a union merely because he was a member, or because
he had some relation to the union."2 The agency theory was
used to hold the union liable on the ground, that inasmuch as the
members of the union were to some extent its agents, a union
which did not disavow the acts of its members by expelling them
0 Attorney at Law, associated with the firm of Ropes & Gray, Boston, Mass.
B.A., Yale; LL.B., University of Detroit; LL.M., Harvard.
' See, e.g., United States v. Debs, 64 Fed. 724 (C.C. Ill. 1894).
2 United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 419
(1947) (Frankfurter's dissenting opinion).
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would be deemed to have ratified their conduct.3 Other courts,
however, refused to hold a union liable unless the unlawful
conduct were authorized, ratified, or within the scope of an
agent's authority.
4
The chief difficulty facing the courts at this time was the fact
that at common law the union, unlike a corporation, could not be
regarded as an entity apart from its members. To say that the
union was liable was to say that each member of the union was
individually liable even though the individual member was not
ordinarily in a position to control decisions governing the conduct
of the union or its agents. The union, a functioning and autono-
mous unit, generally retains such controls among its officers as a
delegation from the members, much as a board of directors is
delegated- authority by the shareholders. A proper allocation of
responsibility commensurate with the distribution of operating
control would hold the union members liable only for conduct
authorized, participated in, or ratified by them. The union and
its officers would not be "agents" of each member. It would,
however, be liable both for conduct which it ratified and for the
acts of agents functioning within the scope of their authority.
To reflect this distribution of control-in the allocation of
liability, procedural devices for reaching the assets of the union
were needed. Section 801(b) of the Labor-Management Rela-
tions Act,5 by allowing the union to be treated as an entity apart
from its members overcame the obstacles to suit in the federal
courts for violations of the collective bargaining agreement and
for unlawful secondary boycotts:
Any such labor organization may-sue or be sued as an
entity and in behalf of the employees whom it represents
in the courts of the United States. Any money judgment
against a labor organization in a district court of the United
States shall be enforceable only against the organization as
an entity and against its assets, and shall not be enforceable
against any individual member or his assets.
3 E.g., Great Northern Ry. v. Local Great Falls Lodge of IAM, No. 287, 283
Fed. 557, 560-61 (D. Mont. 1922); Alaska Steamship Co. v. ILA, 236 Fed. 964,
972 (W.D. Wash. 1916).4 E.g., Russell and Sons v. Stampers and Gold Leaf Local 22, 57 Misc. 96, 107
N.Y. Supp. 303, 808 (Sup. Ct. 1907). See cases cited in Witmer, "Trade Union
Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Association," 51 Yale LJ. 40, 49
i.37(1941).
5 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §185(b) (1958).
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State statutes recognizing this principle have been so widely
adopted that the common law rule prohibiting suit against. an
unincorporated association in its own name now prevails in only
five states," and even in these states there is recourse to the class
suit, a suit brought in equity by or against representatives of- a
group of individuals who have a common right or liability.
7
Although the laws of several states still impose liability, on the
members of the union as principals, for example, by authorizing
suit against the members on the judgment obtained against the
union," and although the class suit may not always be a successful
6 The five states are Illinois, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Missouri, and West
Virginia.
Illinois. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Franklin Union, Local 4, 323 IMI. App.
590, 56 N.E. 2d 476 (1944).
Louisiana. Louisiana ex rel. Doane v. Gen. Longshore Workers, 61 So. "2d
747 (La. Ct. App. 1952). However, a union has been held civilly liable for
breach of a right to work law, Hanson v. Intl Union of Operating Engineers, 79
So. 2d 199 (La. Ct. App. 1955), and suits in the name of the labor organization
have been permitted without discussion in several cases. See cases cited in- the
Hanson case, supra. A statute providing that any voluntary association may be
sued on any obligation incurred for the benefit of such association has been limited
to cases where the association has incurred obligations in its name and for its
benefit. Monroe v. Krause & Managan Lumber Co., 24 So. 2d 501 (La. Ct. App.
1946).
Massachusetts. Pickett v. Walsh, 192 Mass. 572, 589-90, 78 N.E. 753 (1906).
Cf. Maguire v. Reough, 238 Mass. 98, 100, 130 N.E. 270, 271 (1921) (equity
suit for death benefits dismissed as legal in nature).
Missouri. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F. 2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948)
(recognizes an exception for a suit on a contract obligation made by a union
which has been designated a fraternal benefit or insurance society). A 1949
statute which provides for class actions contains a provision that "nothing in this
section shall be construed to affect the rights or liabilities of labor unions to sue
or be sued." This statute has been construed to apply to hybrid class actions,
and since suits by unincorporated associations are in the nature- of true class
actions, the long established doctrine that representative actions could be brought
at law as well as in equity, Robinson v. Nick, 235 Mo. App. 461. 136 S.W. 2d 374
(1940); Church Shoe Co. v. Turner, 218 Mo. App. 516, 279 S.W. 232, 237
1926); Clarkson v. Laiblan, 202 Mo. App. 682, 216 S.W. 1029. 1033 (1919),
remain intact. White v. Quisenberry, 14 F.R.D. 348 (W.D. Mo. 1953).
West Virginia. The common law rule governs, Milam v. Settle, 127 W.Va.
271, 32 S.E. 2d 269 (1944). except for statutory exceptions regarding the enforce-
ment of trademark rights, W.Va. Code, ch. 47, art. 2 §4550 (1955), the capacity
of a trade union to receive gifts through a trustee, W.Va. Code, ch. 35, art. 2,
§3501 (1955), and the functioning of fraternal and insurance benefit societies.
See Simpson v. Grand Intl Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 83 W.Va. 355, 98
S.E. 580 (1919) (union held not to be fraternal benefit association because it paid
no benefits).
7 Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Langer, 168 F. 2d 182 (8th Cir. 1948); 3
Moore, Fed. Prac. f23.08 (1) (2d ed. 1948, Supp. 1957). It may be that the
concept of a common right or liability is one which is consequent upon a holding
that the members of the class should be bound by the determination as to the
common issue. Chafee, Some Problems of Equity 256-58 (1950).
8Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 361 U.S. 459, 473 (1960) (Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion).0 E.g., N.Y. Gen. Associations Law §§13, 16. An action may be taken against
the members only when the judgment has been returned unsatisfied. Flagg v.
Nichols, 307 N.Y. 96, 120 N.E. 2d 513 (1954).
KENTUcKY LAW JouRNAL [Vol. 49,
means of surmounting the diversity of citizenship requirement in
the federal courts,10 a sufficient procedural foundation for reach-
ing the assets of the union now exists in most states to support
agency rules appropriate for the union as distinguished from its
members."'
In addition to these statutory attempts to overcome procedural
obstacles to suits against the union, a substantive standard of
agency requiring proof of actual authorization, participation, or
ratification was enacted by Congress as section 6 of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act.'2 In 1947 this provision was held by the Supreme
Court of the United States to relieve the union of liability for all
acts which it had not authorized even though such acts might
have been done by agents of the union acting within the scope
of their authority. 3 Congress immediately responded to this
limitation on union liability by providing in the amended National
10 E.g., Underwood v. Maloney, 256 F. 2d 334 (3rd Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 864 (1958). For a general discussion of class suits and federal procedure,
see Kaplan, "Suits Against Unincorporated Associations under the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure," 53 Mich. L. Rev. 945, 952 (1955). For a thorough analysis
of the Underwood case on this point see Note, "The Problem of Capacity in Union
Suits: A Potpourri of Erie, Diversity and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,"
68 Yale L.J. 1182 (1959).
"1 For the voluminous literature on the suability problem see Witmer,
"Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the Unincorporated Association," 51
Yale L.J. 40, 47 (1941). For discussions of the suability of labor organizations, see
also Frankfurter and Greene, The Labor Injunction, ch. III (1930); Warren,
Corporate Advantages Without Incorporation (1929); Cole, "The Civil Suability
at Law, of Labor Unions," 8 Fordham L. Rev. 29 (1939); Dodd, "Dogma and
Practice in the Law of Associations," 42 Harv. L. Rev. 977 (1929); Forkosch,
"The Legal Status and Suability of Labor Organizations," 28 Temp. L.Q. 1
(1954); Goodhart, "The Legal Personality of a Trade Union," 70 Law Q. Rev. 322
(1954); Kaye & Allen, "The Suability of Unions," 1 Lab. L.J. 705 (1950); Lloyd,
"Damages for Wrongful Expulsion from a Trade Union," 19 Modem L. Rev. 121
(1956); Comment, "Suability of Trade Union as a Legal Entity," 33 Calif. L.
Rev. 444 (1945); Sturges, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions," 33
Yale L.J. 383 (1924); Note, "Responsibility of Labor Unions for Acts of Memn-
bers," 38 Colum. R. Rev. 454 (1938); Note, "Trade Union Suability," 32 Va. L.
Rev. 394 (1946); Note, "Unions as Juridical Persons," 66 Yale L.J. 712 (1957).
1247 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §106 (1958). Section 6 provides:
No officer or member of any association or organization, and no
association or organization participating or interested in a labor dis-
pute, shall be held responsible or liable in any court of the United
States for the unlawful acts of individual officers, members, or agents,
except upon clear proof of such acts, or of ratification of such acts
after actual knowledge thereof.
This provision reflects the rule adopted in United Mine Workers v. Coronado
Coal Co., 259 U.S. 344 (1922). There the national union was held not to have
ratified the conduct of the local union even though the national president ex-
pressed sympathy with the strike.
13 United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v United States, 330 U.S, 395,
40(-7 (1947).
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Labor Relations Act 14 and the Labor-Management Relations Act
of 194715 that
[I]n determining whether any person is acting as an
"agent" of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific
acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling.
These latter acts restored the common law rules of agency in
proceedings against labor unions before the NLRB and the
federal courts and thereby restricted the application of section 6
to situations in which union members and not the union are
sought to be held as principals. 6
Theoretically the restoration of the common law rules of
agency might seem to accord with the distribution of authority
within the union; but in practice one finds a continuing shift of
power from the local to the national union as well as an emerging
group of intermediate union bodies. Thus, the broad outlines of
the law defining the nature of the relationship between the
national union and its subordinate bodies have by no means been
finally drafted. Clarification is needed concerning the burden of
responsibility toward union members, employers, and the general
public which the national union should sustain for the conduct
of its subordinate organizations and officers. May the national
14 61 Stat. 137 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §152(13) (1958), amending 49 Stat. 450
(1935).
15 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §185(e) (1958).16 Section 6 precludes denial of reinstatement to any employee after a strike
in which unfair labor practices are committed unless it can be shown that he
participated, authorized, or ratified the unfair labor practice. NLRB v. Marshall
Car Wheel and Foundry Co., 218 F. 2d 409 (5th Cir. 1955). Compare Louisville
& N. R.R. v. Brown, 252 F. 2d 149 (5th Cir. 1958) (conspiracy doctrine applied
to railroad employees who fomented unauthorized strike).
The instances in which §6 might be applied to unions in labor disputes not
falling under the Taft-Hartley Act are few. Diversity jurisdiction between
employers and unions has been reduced because a corporation is now regarded
as a citizen of its principal place of business under §1332. 72 Stat. 415, 28
U.S.C. §1332(c) (1958). An argument can be made that §6 is not jurisdictional
and hence should not be applied at all in diversity actions. Although the injunc-
tion sections of the act are expressly jurisdictional, Senator Taft has pointed out
that §6 has nothing to do with injunctions. 93 Cong. Rec. 6521 (1947). In Sisco
v. McNutt, 209 F. 2d 550 (8th Cir. 1954), failure by the union to raise the
defense of §6 at the trial level did not deorive the court of jurisdiction to the
extent that the section could not be raised on appeal. Similarly, although the
Supreme Court in United Bhd. of Carpenters and joiners v. United States, 330
U.S. 395, 403 (1947), declined to decide whether §6 was evidentiary or substan-
tive, if an agency rule is not substantive, it is difficult to find a rule of law that
would be. If §6 is neither jurisdictional nor evidentiary it would arguably be
Unconstitutional under the Erie doctrinq if applied in diversity litigation,
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union escape responsibility for the acts of a local union by simply
disavowing those acts? Should the national union be obliged to
supervise the internal relations between local unions and their
members? Such questions confront us in our attempt to clarify
the role to be played by the national union in the American indus-
trial relations system.
Since the law of agency has traditionally provided criteria for
determining when one party should be held responsible for the
acts of another, this branch of the law shall be our principal
guide. Our course shall be as follows: to consider fiirst the national
union's liability for authorized conduct, and second, its liability
for unauthorized conduct. In the first section the extent to which
a national union can be deemed to have authorized conduct for
which it can be held liable will be outlined. The principles
governing authorized conduct will be distinguished from those
which govern the liability of the union for unauthorized conduct,
and then the specific problem of actual authorization, ratification
by silence, and ratification by acceptance of benefits will be dis-
cussed. In the second section an attempt will be made to formu-
late a satisfactory theory for the imposition of responsibility upon
the national union for unauthorized conduct. The relevance of
the doctrine of respondeat superior to this problem will be con-
sidered and then the doctrine will be applied to officers and mem-
bers as agents of the local union and to the local and intermediate
unions as agents of the national union.
I. CoNDucT AuTHORuZED BY T-E NATIONAL UNION
The law of agency provides two theories for holding a union
responsible for the unlawful conduct of its subordinate organiza-
tions and members. The first is a principle of consent, recognized
in the form of authorization, participation, or ratification. The
second is the doctrine of respondeat superior. This doctrine pro-
vides generally that a master is liable for the physical acts of his
servant which are performed in the scope of the servant's employ-
ment.
A. The Principle of Consent
Consent and respondeat superior perform essentially different
functions. The principle of consent simply provides a basis for
holding a union bound to a relationship which it manifestly
[Vol. 49,
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intended to create,17 whereas respondeat superior effectuates
factors such as control by the union or benefit to the union which
justify the imposition of strict liability. To put this distinction
more succinctly, the unlawful conduct must be authorized by
the union in order to find liability on the basis of consent,
whereas the authorization of lawful conduct to which the unlaw-
ful conduct can be closely related is all that is required by the
doctrine of respondeat superior. For example, if a union author-
izes a lawful strike and picket line, and a steward is guilty of
assault while preventing a nonstriking employee from crossing
the picket line, liability can be imposed on the union for the
assault on the basis of respondeat superior, but not on the basis
of consent, because the steward's conduct was unauthorized. If,
however, the union authorizes an unlawful picket line, then lia-
bility for the damage caused to the nonstriking employee by the
picket line could be imposed on the union on the basis of consent.
In order to effectuate the policies underlying each theory
neither should be used to perform the other's function. For
example, if the measure of the union's liability for unlawful con-
duct is whether the conduct foreseeably follows from the union's
initial grant of authority, the limitations imposed by the policies
behind the doctrine of respondeat superior should be applicable
because the union has probably not consented to the unlawful
conduct.' Conversely, if the union has consented to unlawful
conduct, it is not necessary to inquire whether the conduct is
within the scope of the agent's authority. Since the principle of
consent is limited to situations in which actual authorization of
unlawful conduct can be shown, the question whether liability
17 Sunset Line and Twine Company, 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1508 (1948), the
leading case in the law of agency in NLRB proceedings, lays down the following
rule:
Agency is a contractual relationship, deriving from the mutual
consent of principal and agent that the agent shall act for the
principal. But the principal's consent, technically called authorization
or ratification, may be manifested by conduct, sometimes even passive
acquiescence as well as by words. Authority to act as agent in a
given manner will be implied whenever the conduct of the principal
is such as to show that he actually intended to confer that authority.
18 E.g., Selby-Battersby & Co. v. NLRB, 259 F. 2d 151, 156 (4th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 952 (1959):
The Council, at the time, may have thought there was nothing
illegal in such a strike, but since it was the natural consequence of the
course of events it initiated, it cannot escape responsibility for it.
Cf. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 41 CCH Lab. Cas. §16,658
(D.C. Cir. 1961).
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should be imposed on a local or national union is largely one of
fact. The following discussion, therefore, necessarily will be
limited to a brief summary of the evidence required to support
a finding of authorization and to the related questions of whether
the union's silence or its acceptance of benefits can constitute
consent.
B. Actual Authorization
Authorization may be established by showing that the officers
or agents of the union participated in or instigated the unlawful
conduct. 19 Circumstantial evidence is often sufficient. Mere pres-
ence of a union official at the scene of unlawful conduct, for
example, does not constitute authorization, 20 but presence fol-
lowed by a sympathetic article in a union paper does.2 Similarly,
an inference that the union sanctioned an unlawful strike is per-
mitted when all the members of the union simultaneously leave
work, stating that they are quitting.22 The union may also grant
its consent by express ratification, for example, by the payment
of strike benefits23 or by the refusal to disavow conduct when
requested to do so by the management. 4
C. Ratification by Silence
Whether ratification can be inferred from silence is a more
difficult question. If the cause of action is for injuries resulting
from an automobile accident involving a union business agent,
there would clearly be no duty to disaffirm the conduct. 5 If the
19 See, e.g., UMW v. Patton, 211 F. 2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954) (organizer led
mob march on mine); Oil Workers Int'l v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512,
230 P. 2d 71 (Dist. Ct. 1951) (speechmaking by president); American Zinc Co.
v. Vecera, 338 Ill. App. 523, 88 N.E. 2d 116 (1949) (union placed headquarters
on picket line); North Elec. Mfg. Co., 84 N.L.R.B. 136 (1949) (national repre-
sentative led pickets).2oPerry Norvell Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225, 245 (1948).
21 Sunset Line and Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948).
22 Styles v. Local 760, IBEW, 80 F. Supp. 119 (E.D. Tenn. 1948). Cf. Los
Angeles Bldg. and Constr. Trades Council, 105 N.L.R.B. 868 (1953) (members
of two locals simultaneously struck and then returned to work).
23 See cases cited in Witmer, "Trade Union Liability: The Problem of the
Unincorporated Association," 51 Yale L.J. 40, 49 n.36 (1941). Cf. Pen Norvell
Co., 80 N.L.R.B. 225, 247 (1948): "[Alt no time did United or its locals furnish
financial assistance to the Committee."24 E.g., Boone County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957); The Englander
Co., 108 N.L.R.B. 38 (1954).
25 Ford v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 315 P. 2d 299 (Wash.
1957) (automobile accident):
We are not here concerned with the principles of apparent
agency, which apply when an alleged principal has held out another
(footnote continued on next page)
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driving which caused the accident were within the scope of the
agent's authority, the union would be liable. If the driving were
beyond his scope of authority, the union would not be liable. If,
on the other hand, the members of a local union are conducting
an unlawful picket line and national union representatives who
have played a prominent role in local union affairs and in the
conduct of local negotiations are present,26 the prior conduct of
the national representatives would be sufficient to impose a duty
to disavow the unlawful conduct. From these examples it may be
concluded that only if there is a prior course of conduct on the
part of the union which imposes upon it the duty to act will
silence constitute evidence of ratification where the cause of
action is grounded in tort.2"
If, however, it is clear from other evidence that the union has
authorized the unlawful conduct or that such conduct is within
the scope of authority of an agent of the union, neither a dis-
avowal nor a good faith attempt to settle the dispute should be
permitted to relieve the union from liability.2 Otherwise dis-
avowal would become a convenient device for the union to escape
liability.29 If, for example, the president and secretary of a local
(footnote continued from preceding page)
as his agent and induced a third ]person to rely on the existence of
the agency, when in fact none existed. There is no element of
reliance involved in a case such as this.20 Compare Brown v. Local 326, OWIU, 80 F. Supp. 708 (N.D. Cal. 1948)
(international participation in local affairs); North Elec. Mfg. Co., 84 N.L.R.B.
136 (1949) (international representatives continually on the scene).2 7 Sunset Line and Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487 (1948) (ratification where
international union did not disavow conduct of local leaders during strike spon-
sored by international), supra note 17. Compare ILGWU v. NLRB, 237 F. 2d
545, 552 (D.C. Cir. 1956): "[W]e think they [employees] were under no obliga-
tion to disavow misconduct which they did not initiate and with which they are
not shown to have been connected . . ." with United Elec., Radio & Machine
Workers v. NLRB, 223 F. 2d 338, 343 (D.C. Cir. 1955) (ratification by silenceby individual employees when the membership authorized strike resulting in
unfair labor practice). Cf. Jay-K Independent Lumber Corp., 108 N.L.R.B. 1323(1954) (no duty to disavow unless there is opportunity to disavow).
t see Westmoreland Coal Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), modified on
other grounds, sub nora, Local Union 9735, UMWA v. NLRB, 258 F. 2d 146
(D.C. C. 1958) (,disavowal suffiient to relieve national even though strike
within scope of agent's authority). Compare United Constr. Workers v. Haislip
Baking Co., 223 F. 2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955) (field representative relieved United
Mine Workers from liabilit y disavowing local strike).
29 United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners v. United States, 330 U.S. 395, 421
(1947) (Frankf-urter's dissenting opinion objecting to proof of actual authoriza-tion) : The teaching of the present case can hardly fail. To come under
the Court's indulgent rule of immunity from liability for the acts of
its officers, unions will, . . . doubtless in good conscience, have
(footnote continued on next page)
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union, assisted by several lesser officials, call a strike, the fact that
the remaining officers disavow the strike and take every step
within their power to end the dispute should not be a valid
defense.
If the duty to disavow the strike is imposed by an implied or
express no-strike clause rather than by the union's prior conduct, 0
the union's failure to disavow or to make a good faith attempt to
settle the strike should not necessarily be conclusive evidence of
ratification. There are two reasons why failure to disavow an
unauthorized strike under an implied or express no-strike clause
should not be deemed conclusive. First, the courts have been
unwilling to hold the union liable in damages where the union
has not expressly assumed liability for strikes it has not author-
ized,31 even though an unauthorized strike permits the employer
to terminate the contract with the union.32 Secondly, circum-
stances surrounding the strike may be such that a disavowal or
an attempt to get the striking union members to return to work
would be of no avail. If in the example above there were a no-
strike clause imposing a duty on the national union to disavow
the strike, but the remaining local union officers were unsuccess-
ful in their attempt to terminate the strike, it would seem
anomalous to hold the national union liable for failing to disavow
or to attempt to settle the strike. On the other hand, since
national intervention may succeed where local efforts fail, in the
absence of proof by the national union that an attempt to settle
the strike or to disavow it would have been useless, it would not
be unfair to find that the national had breached the contract by
failing to disavow the strike.
A more workable rule than one which holds that failure to
disavow is conclusive evidence of ratification would be one which
shifts the burden to the union to show that it did make every
(footnote continued from preceding page)
standing orders disavowing authority on the part of their officers to
make any agreements which may be found in violation of the Sher-
man Law.30 United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768, 772 (1949):
We believe that this complete failure by the Union to attempt
to end the strike, or even to renounce it, during the three days follow-
ing the walk-out, constituted a clear violation....31 United Constr. Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 228 F. 2d 872 (4th Cir.
1955). But it is not an unfair labor practice for an employer to insist on a no-
strike provision which would make the union liable for unauthorized strikes.
Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., 128 N.L.R.B. 647 (1959).
32 United Elastic Corp., 84 N.L.R.B. 768 (1949).
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reasonable effort to end the dispute or that any effort at all would
have been useless. The union, which has voluntarily assumed the
duty to discourage strikes that violate the agreement, is in the
best position to bear the burden of proof.
D. Ratification by Acceptance of Benefits
The benefit from which a ratification can be inferred must be
distinguished from the benefit which a union derives from ratify-
ing unlawful conduct. The latter might consist of furthering its
interest in the outcome of the unlawful conduct or merely of
preserving its political standing with its members and subordinate
organizations. If long run advantages such as these did not out-
weigh the short run disadvantages, the union would not ratify
unlawful conduct. Because such benefits justify the imposition
of liability on the union there is no need for the application to the
union of the common law rule that a principal cannot ratify acts
unless they are intended or purported to be performed on his
behalf.
3
In the former instance the ratification is inferred from the
acceptance of the benefit. Ratification through acceptance of
benefits should be compared to ratification by silence. Both arise
from a failure to discharge a similar duty. The duty which pro-
vides a basis for ratification by silence arises from union conduct
prior to the unlawful conduct or from an employer-union contract.
The duty to act in the case of a ratification through acceptance
of benefits should arise when the unlawful conduct makes a sub-
stantial contribution to the achievement of a clearly defined
union policy.
This definition of ratification through acceptance of benefits
can be best illustrated through example. The first example may
define "substantial contribution" more precisely. If a picket
strikes a bystander during a lawful strike in the course of negotia-
tions by a local union, the fact that the president of the national
union ultimately signed the contract would not be sufficient to
bind the national union. 4 The picket's conduct would not be a
33 Restatement, Agency, Reporter's Notes, §85, at 148 (1958).84 Adamson v. UMWA, 3 Utah 2d 37, 277 P. 2d 972, 975 (1954):
[T]here is no implied agency by ratification, even though John
L. Lewis . .. ultimately signed the agreement . . . and . . . the
International Union received some benefit from the bargain. This is
(footnote continued on next page)
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factual cause of the success of negotiations. "Substantial contri-
bution" should be at least a factual cause making possible the
success of the union's policy.
The second example shows that the union should not be
required to abandon pursuit of a legitimate policy, such as the
attempt to reopen a contract, in order to avoid responsibility for
unauthorized and unlawful conduct which contributes to the
success of the policy. A strike by a local union occurred in one
of the Ford Motor Company's plants. 5 The UAW international
union had been unsuccessful in persuading Ford to reopen its
contract for negotiations. The local strike caused shortages of
parts at other plants which eventually caused Ford to reopen the
national agreement for negotiation. Had Ford as a practical
matter been able to bring suit for breach of contract, the benefit
received by the international union and its members through the
assistance provided by the strike would have justified a finding of
ratification. The unlawful strike was not only a factual cause but
also a proximate cause for the achievement of a clear and im-
mediate policy of the national union.
If, however, the UAW had tried to stop the strike but its
success in persuading Ford to reopen the agreement had been
attributable in part to the effect of the strike, the UAW's attempt
to settle the strike should nevertheless have been regarded as a
rejection of the benefit afforded by the strike. Even though the
unlawful conduct may make a substantial contribution to the
achievement of a clearly defined union policy, the union must be
given the opportunity to disavow the conduct in order to prevent
ratification through acceptance of the benefits from being a
broader base for liability than ratification by silence.
The third example is concerned primarily with the meaning
of "clear and definite policy". Assume that a national union is
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
true since the plaintiff did not sustain the burden of introducing
some substantial evidence tending to show the facts upon which
a ratification must be predicated.
35 Detroit News, May 28, 1953, 1, p. 20, col. 3. This type of strike raises
an interesting question about the status of employees who are laid off as a result
of the strike. In dealing with the question whether the laid-off employees are in
the same plant or establishment, e.g., Nordling v. Ford Motor Co., 231 Minn. 68,
42 N.W. 2d 576 (1950), the court in United States Steel Corp. v. Wood, 114 So.
2d 533 (Ala. Ct. App. 1959), rejected an argument that members in one local
should be deemed to have authorized a strike in another local by reason of the
fact that the national union was in control of the strike.
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vitally interested in local negotiations involving production stand-
ards because the outcome of these negotiations could well set a
precedent in other plants in the industry. In the course of the
negotiations a strike occurs during which the local union estab-
lishes an unlawful picket line around one of the employer's
supplier plants. The unlawful picket line in fact contributes
substantially to the success of the strike. The contract is then
submitted to the national union and approved. Unless the local
negotiations can be found to further a clearly defined national
policy the ultimate signature of the national union on the contract
would not be a ratification by acceptance of benefit. Although it
is difficult to determine when local union conduct benefits national
union policy, the fact that the national union signed the contract
and its concern in the outcome of the strike would probably be
sufficient to justify holding it responsible in this case.
The definition of "clear and definite union policy" is relevant
also to the issue whether an agency relationship can be found
on the basis of respondeat superior. If in the above example the
national union had been shown to have a right of control or
actual control over the local in the conduct of negotiations, the
fact that the negotiations concerned a "clear and definite" na-
tional policy would be sufficient to create an agency in the local
union for the purpose of conducting the negotiations. 6 If the
unlawful picketing were within the scope of authority of an agent
of the local, then the national union would be liable. Although
a solution common to both the agency and ratification questions
may blur the distinction between liability based on the principle
of consent and that based on respondeat superior, two factors
remain to preserve the distinction. First, although it may be
sufficient to show that the act is within the scope of an agent's
authority to establish liability on an agency theory, liability on a
theory of acceptance of benefit can be established only through
demonstrating that the unlawful conduct is a factual cause of the
success of the policy attributable to the national union. Thus, if
the unlawful picket line in the third example were not a factual
cause of the success of the union policy, no liability could be
imposed under the theory of ratification even though the picket
line would be within the scope of authority delegated to the
36E.g., Chicago Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1949).
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pickets by the local union. Secondly, if an agency relationship
is established, the national union may not escape liability by
attempting to terminate the unlawful conduct, whereas a good
faith attempt to settle the dispute would always be sufficient to
preclude liability on the basis of ratification by silence or by
acceptance of the benefits.
The underlying policies which justify the imposition of re-
sponsibility on the union are thus subordinated to limitations
designed to preserve the principle of consent. These limitations
insure that consent can only be found in justifiable inferences
from fact. Authorization thus should not be predicated on a
theory of proximate cause. Ratification by silence or acceptance
of benefits can be imposed only when the union fails to dis-
charge a duty established by a prior course of union conduct, by
an employer-union agreement, or by unlawful conduct which
makes a substantial contribution to a clear and definite union
policy. Since these rules can only indirectly reflect the basic
problem of reaching a balance between the freedom of the
national union and the liability and responsibility commensurate
with its power, the major part of this task must be performed by
a theory for holding unions liable for the unauthorized conduct
of their subordinate organizations and members.
II. CoNDucT UNAUTHORIZED BY THE NATIONAL UNION
The imposition of liability on a union for the unauthorized
conduct of its agents derogates from the principle that there can
be no liability without fault. In the light of the fairness demanded
by this general principle, the scope of this section of the article
will be to determine the effectiveness of the technical agency
doctrine of respondeat superior as a device for holding the
national union responsible for the unauthorized conduct of its
subordinate unions and members. After describing the doctrine
of respondeat superior and pointing out its relevance to individual
officers and members as agents of the union, the major task of
this article will be commenced, namely, an analysis and exposition
of a theory of agency applicable to the relationship of local and
intermediate union bodies with the national union.
[Vol. 49,
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A. The Doctrine of Respondeat Superior
Technically the doctrine of respondeat superior refers to the
imposition of liability on a master for the physical damage
caused by the torts of his servants within the scope of their
employment 37 and for the pecuniary loss caused by the unauthor-
ized fraud, defamation, or malicious prosecution within the scope
of authority of an agent who is not a servant.38 Its scope is broad
enough to cover all of the ordinary activities of the labor union.f9
Although much of the damage inflicted by the wrongful acts of
labor unions is pecuniary rather than physical, the manner in
which such damage is inflicted is not dissimilar from defamation
and other misrepresentations. In defamation the damage to the
plaintiff's reputation is caused by public reliance on the validity
of the agent's representations. The damage caused by a picket
line or consumer boycott, for example, also turns on reliance upon
the acts and representations of the agents of the labor union.
Because such tortious conduct by agents of the labor union may
also constitute a breach of contract, the doctrine of respondeat
superior should also be applicable in litigation resulting from
breaches of a contract signed by the national union.
40
Wholly apart from its technical requirements there can be no
doubt that the general policies which justify the application of
the doctrine of respondeat superior are present in many situations
involving unions.41 The fact that the union is in a position of
control or that it derives benefit from the agent's conduct may be
sufficient to warrant a finding of liability. Justification may also
be found in reliance on the authority of the agent or in the
superior position of the union to pay or to spread the cost of the
37 Seavey & Hall, Law of Agency 37 (1956).
38Ibid. See Restatement, Agency §8 (A), comment b at 37 (1958), whch
classifies the principle of respondeat superior under the general heading of 'In-
herent Agency Power." Although fraud, defamation, or malicious prosecution
are not expressly covered by section 8 (A), the fact of reliance by the third party
also binds the principal for these tortious acts of a non-servant agent. See Re-
statement, Agency §§161, 216 (1958).
39 Cox, 'Some Aspects of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947," 61
Harv. L. Rev. 274, 311 (1948).
40 Ibid.
41See Seavey, "Speculation as to Respondeat Superior," Harvard Legal
Essays, 433 (1934). In this article, Professor Seavey gives six policies underlying
the doctrine of respondeat superior: reliance, benefits, determent, difficulty of
proving negligence, and the deep pocket and insurance principles.
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injury. The presence of interests such as these may prevent the
application of respondeat superior to the union from being unfair.
Two analogies suggest that the doctrine of respondeat su-
perior cannot be applied to the relationship between a local
and national union. First, a national-local union relationship may
be compared to that of a parent to a subsidiary corporation. 2
Subsidiary corporations are usually subject to the degree of con-
trol necessary to find an agency in fact, but because of the limited
liability characteristic of the corporate entity, an express agency
must be found in order to bind the parent corporation for the acts
of the subsidiary.43 If this analogy were applied to labor unions,
a national union could be held liable only upon a finding of
agency created by express consent. In the case of labor unions,
however, there is no necessary connection between the principle
of limited liability and the union's status as an "entity". A union
is an "entity"' only because it can be sued in its own name. The
fact that it can be sued in its own name does not limit in any way
the liability of the members of the union in actions brought
against them individually.44
Even if limited liability for the labor union were to be
accepted as a desideratum, the corporate-subsidiary analogy still
cannot provide assistance because the courts have been unable to
work out an adequate rationale to determine when a parent
corporation should be held liable as a matter of substantive law
for the acts of its subsidiary. Procedurally service of process on
a subsidiary has generally been held insufficient to subject a
parent corporation to the jurisdiction of the court.46
This procedural aspect of the corporate-subsidiary analogy
has been carried over to the relationship between the national
and local union in a few cases which have held that service of
process on the local union could not subject the national union
42 Cox, supra, note 39, at 312.
43 Powell, Parent and Subsidiary Corporations 89-102 (1931).
44 Sturges, "Unincorporated Associations as Parties to Actions,' 33 Yale L.J.
383, 404 (1924).
45 See Note, "Liability of a Corporation for Acts of a Subsidiary or Affiliate,"
71 Harv. L. Rev. 1122, 1123 (1958).
46In Cannon Mfg. Co. v. Cudahy Packing Co., 267 U.S. 333 (1925), the
Supreme Court held that a corporation could not be subjected to jurisdiction on
the basis of the activities of its subsidiaries. See "State Court Jurisdiction," 73
Harv. L. Rev. 909, 933, nn.149-51 (1960), for a collection of the few cases
deviating from the Cudahy rule.
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to the jurisdiction of the court.47 However, the majority of cases
dealing with the service of process question, usually in connection
with "doing business in a common name" or "substitute service"
statutes, have held that the national union is doing business
within the jurisdiction by reason of the activities of its local
union.48 Since the parent-subsidiary corporation analogy pro-
vides no rationale for dealing with substantive liability nor for
explaining most cases involving the service of process question,
it should be rejected.
Secondly, the relation of local unions to the national union
may be compared to the municipal-state government relationship:
Local unions are mere subdivisions of the national
organizations whose constitutions provide for their govern-
ment as a state does for its counties, cities, towns, and vil-
lages. The amount of home rule they enjoy is determined
by the national, and they are bound by the laws of their
national governments.49
The degree of home rule retained by each local may be reflected
in the constitution of the national union.50 In Di Maio v. Local
80-A, United Packinghouse Workers of America,51 for example, a
libel action against a national union arising out of a local election
was dismissed on the ground that the local unit possessed constitu-
tionally an independence and autonomy which negated the
existence of any relationship which would make it the general
agent of the national union. The court emphasized: "This is
clearly so with respect to the local's conduct of its internal affairs,
the election of its officers, the maintenance of its purely adminis-
trative offices and the conduct of its ordinary affairs."52 There
47Dean v. Int'l. Longshoremen's Ass'n, 17 F. Supp. 748 (D.La., 1936);
Christian v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 7 F. 2d 481 (W.D. Ky. 1925).
48 E.g., Gainey v. Bhd. of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 177 F. Supp. 421
(E.D. Pa. 1959) ("doing business" statute); Operative Plasterers' & Cement
Finishers' Int'l Assn v. Case, 93 F. 2d 56, 57 (D.D.C. 1937); Int'l Union of
Operating Engineers v. Jones Constr. Co., 240 S.W. 2d 49 (Ky. 1951) ("do-
ing business" statute); Edgar v. Southern Ry. Co., 213 S.C. 445, 49 S.E. 2d
841 (1948) (contracts of insurance issued in state); McDaniel v. Textile Workers
Union, 36 Tenn. App. 236, 254 S.W. 2d 1 (1952) (sustained constitutionality of
substitute service statute as applied to nonresident union).
49 Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 87 (1959).
50 For a general discussion of constitutions and the local union, see Lahne &
Kovner, "Local Union Structure: Formality and Reality," 9 Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev.
24 (1955).
51 29 N.J. Super. 341, 102 A. 2d 480 (L), appeal dismissed, 32 N.J. Super.
136, 108 A. 2d 20 (1954).
52 Id. at 29 N.J. Super. 343, 345, 102 A. 2d at 482.
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can be no doubt, Professor Leiserson has suggested, that local
unions do govern their own affairs:
[T]he specific authority of local officers flows from the
membership meeting. Formal authorization or approval
at a meeting is required for nearly every item of the local's
business, from the payment of bills and answering of letters
to the settlement of grievances and the negotiation of
working contracts with employers.
53
On the other hand, the local-state government analogy cannot
be carried to its logical extreme. Local unions vary greatly in
size and sovereignty. There are between sixty and seventy thou-
sand locals in the country.5 4 Most locals have less than two or
three hundred members, but some, for example, Ford Local 600,
representing the River Rouge area in Michigan, may have as
many as 40,000 members. Some locals have only a loose affiliation
with the national union, paying only a per capita tax, and can
withdraw from the national union at will.55 Others are merely
subordinate units of the national union. These the national
unions regulate with varying degrees of supervisory control. Most
national unions provide that a local union's charter may be
revoked under some circumstances 56 and that the local union and
sometimes its members may be disciplined by the national
union.57 Many require national approval of strikes,5 contracts, or
changes in the constitution or by-laws of the local union.59 Two
53 Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 283 (1959).
54 Forkosch, A Treatise on Labor Law §111 (1953).
55 E.g., Vilella v. McGrath, 136 Conn. 645, 74 A. 2d 187 (1950); Int'l Union
of United Brewery Workers v. Becherer, 4 N.J. Super. 456, 67 A. 2d 900 (1949).
56 E.g., IBEW Constitution, Art. IV, §3(8) (1956):
The I.P. is empowered as follows:
Either to suspend or revoke the charter of any L.U., or have the I.S. reject
the per capita tax from any L.U. that fails or refuses to observe the laws and rules
of the I.B.E.W.
57 National Industrial Conference Board, Studies in Personnel Policy No. 150,
Union Government Structure and Procedure, Table 22, points out that 81 or
41.7% of 194 union constitutions surveyed, covering 17V million union members,
contained provisions permitting members to be disciplined.
58 Id. at 42. Of the 194 constitutions surveyed above, only 10 allow local
unions to strike without international approval. Thirteen constitutions of govern-
ment workers, however, prohibit strikes, and 29 constitutions have no provisions
regarding strikes.
r9 15. at 49-54. Of the 194 constitutions surveyed, only 11 allow locals to
make contracts on their own authority. Thirteen constitutions, covering over two
million employees, grant the international union the sole power to make all
collective bargaining contracts or state that the international may assume this
power where necessary. Eighty-three constitutions give the international union
the power to authorize collective bargaining contracts.
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less obvious but equally effective means of national control are
the stipulation that a local cannot withdraw from the national
union as long as five or seven members object, 60 and check-off
procedures that provide for payment directly from the company
to the national union. Whether constitutional provisions such as
these can yield standards susceptible of judicial application in
order to resolve the conflict between home rule and centralized
control will be the task of the following analysis.
B. Officers and Members as Agents of the Union
A member of a labor union is not, merely by reason of his
membership, an agent of a labor organization, even when his
conduct may implement or be intended to implement the policies
of the union.01 The president, vice-president, secretary-treasurer,
and business agent of the local union are regarded as general
agents for the conduct of the union's business,6 2 as are the officers
and representatives of the national union.63
60 E.g., IBEW Constitution, Art. XVII, §23 (1956):
No L.U. shall withdraw from the I.B.E.W. or dissolve as long as
five members in good standing object thereto. Before withdrawal,
written notice must be given to the I.P. and all books, papers, charters,
funds and all property are to be forwarded to the I.S.
6193 Cong. Rec. 4022 (1947) (Remarks of Senator Taft):
I do not think there is anything in the fact that a union
is an uncorporated association which would bring about a condi-
tion in law that the act of every member is necessarily charged to
the labor organization. No; I think not.
I think that the word 'agent' as used here, as used in the contract
section, and as used in other places in the bill, means an agent under
the ordinary rules of agency, an agent of the labor union, the organiza-
tion, as such. The fact that a man was a member of a labor union
in my opinion would be no evidence whatever to show that he was
an agent. 93 Cong. Rec. 4435 (1947).
62 Sunset Line and Twine Co., 79 N.L.R.B. 1487, 1510 (1948) (businessngent of local):[T]he record does not otherwise show how Vail's duties are defined,
or what are the limitations of his authority; but neither is there any
evidence to rebut the inference, which we might well draw from his
title alone, that he was, at the time of the events involved in this case,
vested with the powers of a general agent to conduct the Local's
business....
Accord, Amalgamated Meat Cutters and Butcher Workmen, 81 N.L.R.B. 1052
(1949). Cf. Lewis v. Benedict Coal Corp., 259 F. 2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), modi-
fied on other grounds, 361 U.S. 459 (1960) (affirms jury instruction that authoriza-
tion is not required). See cases Note, 49 Colum. L. Rev. 884, 387 n.29 (1949)
(collecting cases). A member of the union, or even a foreman who performs the
function of a union officer with the knowledge of the union, will be deemed an
agent of the union with respect to acts similar to those he ordinarily performs.
Teamsters Local 294, 117 N.L.R.B. 1401, 1411 (1957) (employee); NLRB v.
Teamsters Local, 182, 228 F. 2d 83 (2d Cir. 1955) (employee); IBEW Local 5,
121 N.L.R.B. 143 (1958) (foreman).
63 E.g., Garmeada Coal Co. v. UMWA, 122 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Ky. 1954),
aff'd, 230 F, 2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956) (field representative); UMWA v. Patton, 211
(footnote continued on next page)
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The status of stewards is less clear. In NLRB v. P. R.
Mallory & Company," the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held:
With no obligation on the part of the union to com-
pensate, with no right to appoint or discharge and with very
limited authority or control, we discern no basis for a
ruling under a general law of agency that the stewards
were agents of the union.65
These stewards had led a strike to compel the discharge of an
employee in violation of not only section 8(b) (2) of the NLRA,
but also a no-strike clause in the collective bargaining agreement
and express orders from the president of the local union. In a
later opinion holding another local union liable for the enforce-
ment of an unlawful 'ot cargo" clause by its stewards, 6 the
same court distinguished and amplified its Mallory opinion on the
ground that it was "based largely on the undisputed fact that
the stewards were acting contrary to Union policy and to the
express directions which they had received from the Union."
67
The Seventh Circuit's difficulty in finding an adequate ra-
tionale suggests that its conclusion that the stewards were not
agents might have been erroneous. Because the steward is the
bottom link in the chain of union command, his leadership is just
as essential to the union and its operation as that of higher
officials. The fact that he may be closer and hence more respon-
sive to his constituents makes him no less an agent. Although
stewards and other officers are elected and to this extent derive
their authority from the members of the union, the structure of
the local union and collective bargaining in operation rest on a
premise that the power to conduct bargaining and to run union
affairs on a day-to-day basis is not a proper subject for member-
ship action. To this extent the power given to the local union
must be deemed irrevocable. If, for example, the members of a
union decide that a grievance should not be arbitrated after the
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
F. 2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954) (field representative); United Furniture Workers, 84
N.L.R.B. 563 (1949) (organizational representative). But: cf. United Constr.
Workers v. Haislip Baking Co., 223 F. 2d 872 (4th Cir. 1955) (international
representative has no implied authority to ratify an unauthorized strike).
64237 F. 2d 437 (7th Cir. 1956).
65 Id. at 442.
66 NLRB v. Teamsters Local 135, 267 F. 2d 870 (7th Cir. 1959).
07 Id, at 87T,
1961] THE LAW or AGENcc y n THE NATIONAL UNION 315
leaders of the union decide to arbitrate it, the employer, in an
action by the union for specific enforcement of the arbitration
clause,08 should not be able to avail himself of the attempted
revocation of authority by the employees. To abandon this
premise would unduly favor union democracy at the expense of
labor union strength and collective bargaining stability. The
fact that local leaders in practice ordinarily submit many of the
specific details of local union affairs to the membership for
approval in no wise relieves them of their responsibility to con-
duct these affairs in the best interests of the union. It makes
these leaders no less agents of the union.
This approach to the local union was tacitly assumed in
lay-K Independent Lumber Corporation.6 9 In that case the union
authorized picketing only at the situs of a primary employer.
Some of the members followed one of the primary employer's
trucks to a situs of a secondary employer; the steward followed a
second truck to another secondary situs; in both places the un-
loading of the truck was prevented. On the assumption that the
union should be under a greater obligation to control its stewards
than to control its members, the Board properly attributed the
steward's conduct, but not that of the members, to the union.
Once the steward is deemed an agent, a basis is present for an
analysis of the scope of his authority by considering such conven-
tional factors as the time, place, and purpose of his actions, and
whether the unauthorized conduct is similar in quality to author-
ized acts.70 Perhaps the most important criterion is whether the
68 In the Matter of New York Times Co. & Newspaper Guild of N.Y., 2 App.
Div. 2d 31, 152 N.Y.S. 2d 884 (1956). Cf. Milk Drivers v. Cream-O-Land Dairy,
39 N.J. Super. 163, 120 A. 2d 640 (App. Div. 1956) (union under state law may
represent employees even though contract rejected by employees).
69 108 NLRB 1323 (1954), enforced sub nom, NLRB v. Teamsters Local
182, 219 F. 2d 394 (2d Cir. 1955).
70 Restatement, Agency §229 (1958) provides:
(1) To be within the scope of the employment, conduct must be of the
same general nature as that authorized, or incidental to the conduct
authorized.
(2) In determining whether or not the conduct, although not authorized,
is nevertheless so similar to or incidental to the conduct authorized
as to be within the scope of employment, the following matters of fact
are to be considered:
a) whether or not the act is one commonly done by such servants;
b) the time, place and purpose of the act;
c) the previous relations between the master and the servant;
d) the extent to which the business of the master is apportioned
between different servants;
(footnote continued on next page)
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"act is one commonly done by such servants.' 1 Although the
local union president and vice president develop and administer
local union policies, it is not common for committeemen and
stewards to engage in policy-making activities. 72 Their activities
are usually confined to the implementation of established union
policies.73 Contract negotiations, for example, would not be with-
in the scope of a committeeman's or steward's authority in the
absence of an express delegation of authority from the union,
whereas the administration of a contract clearly would be. The
enforcement of policies pertaining to union membership and
intra-union discipline would be within the scope of authority of a
committeeman or steward because they are customarily per-
formed and must necessarily be policed at the lower levels of
union command. Although the secretary-treasurer of the local
union may be charged with the administration of the check-off
machinery, he must rely on committeemen and stewards to see
that new members join the union and sign check-off authoriza-
tions. On the other hand, activities designed to expand the juris-
diction or power of the union, whether through organization of
employees in new plants, through recognition by employers, or
through representation and work assignment disputes with other
unions, are not commonly conducted by stewards or committee-
men in the absence of express direction from the officers of the
local union or clear statement of union policy in the union con-
stitution, by-laws or employer union agreement. One illustration
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
(e) whether or not the act is outside the enterprise of the master
or, if within the enterprise, has not been entrusted to any servant;
(f) whether or not the master has reason to expect that such an act
will be done;
(g) the similarity in quality of the act done to the act authorized-
(h) whether or not the instrumentality by which the harm is done
has been furnished by the master to the servant;
(i) the extent of departure from the normal method of accomplishing
an authorized result; and
71 Ibid. (j) whether or not the act is seriously criminal.
72 The term "committeeman" is sometimes used interchangeably with that
of steward. See, e.g., Ford-UAW National Agreement. In this article it shall be
used to designate an intermediate union official who stands between the officers
of the local and the steward. See, e.g., Chrysler-U.A.W. National Agreement.
73 See, e.g., Clarkson v. Laiblan, 202 Mo. App. 682, 216 S.W. 1029 (1919)
(strike threat to exclude nonunion men within steward's authority); Teamsters
Local 249, 116 N.L.R.B. 399 (1956) (insistence that member wrongfully be kept
from work within steward's authority). The former case was predicated on an
express union policy, whereas the latter was deemed to be incidental to the
steward's normal administration of membership matters,
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of such a clear statement of policy is the "hot cargo" clause
mentioned above.74 If the activity is one commonly conducted
by committeemen and stewards, the fact that it is disavowed by
the union or that it is contrary to an express union policy should
be of no consequence. On the other hand, if the activity is not
commonly done by committeemen and stewards, the fact that the
conduct is contrary to orders from the local union or to union
policy should have a direct bearing on whether that conduct will
be attributable to the union.
A second criterion looks to the time, place, and purpose of the
act.75 For example, if a steward were to lead employees out on
strike in a district which he did not represent, he would be
acting beyond the scope of his authority. Similarly, if members
of a union authorized to conduct a picket line assault a non-
striking employee in a town several miles away,761 this conduct
cannot be attributed to the union. If, however, an officer of the
union accompanies the members when they commit unlawful
acts at a distance remote from the picket line,'77 the union becomes
liable. Although time and place are concrete factors, the test of
purpose is more difficult to apply. If a steward is acting on his
own behalf when he refuses to unload a truck rather than as a
union leader,' his conduct is not attributable to the union.
Stewards who participate in a strike, although subject to greater
discipline than other employees,' 9 are not necessarily acting in
their capacity as union leaders.80 The strike might have occurred
without their participation or leadership. If a higher union of-
ficial becomes involved, there is greater likelihood that his con-
duct constitutes an incentive to the strikers; hence acts less than
74 Supra note 66 and accompanying text.
75 Restatement, Agency §229 (1958), supra note 70.
76 United Furniture Workers, 84 N.L.R.B. 563 (1949).
77 Ibid. The United Furniture case, supra note 76, also presents an interesting
study of the overlapping authority of the national and local unions in the strike.
The Board found that the establishment of the picket line by the national repre-
sentative was within his scope of authority, and hence made the picketing and the
physical restraint incidental to it attributable to the national. But the conduct
away from the picket line in which the local committeeman participated was not
charged to the national union, even though it was within their scope of authority
as agents of the local.
78 NLRB v. Lumber Drivers Local 522, 35 CCH Lab. Cas. §71,906 (D.N.J.
1958).
79 See Note, "Considerations in Disciplining Employees for Participation in
Violations of the No-Strike Clause," 106 U. Pa. L. Rev. 999, 1017-20 (1958).
80Babcock & Wilcox Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 681 (H. J. Dworkin 1957); Aurora
Gasoline Co., 29 Lab. Arb. 495 (R. G. Howlett 1957).
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actual participation may be sufficient to constitute an authoriza-
tion of the strike by the union."'
If the plant management should discharge the secretary of a
local union for falsification of his employment application and
thereafter the secretary distributes a leaflet to employees, urging
them to bide their time until an advantageous moment for a
strike occurs, and the employees walk out at the first opportune
time and refuse to return to work until the secretary is reinstated,
the fact that the officer was promoting his reinstatement and the
fact that he did not actually participate in the strike should not be
sufficient to place the conduct beyond his scope of authority.
Ordinarily the protection of discharged officers is of considerable
concern to the union. Similarly, when the president of the union
indicates that he sympathizes with a strike, but does not par-
ticipate in it, the strike should be attributed to the union.s'
A final criterion is whether the methods chosen by the union
representative are reasonable and incidental to the conduct
authorized. A steward, in the course of handling a grievance
which alleges a management speed-up caused by undermanning
an assembly line operation, may instruct employees to limit their
production by riding down the assembly line beyond the point
where the next employees should begin. These instructions should
be deemed incidental to the steward's power to settle grievances,
because the steward is generally regarded as having authority to
request his constituents to meet the standard set by management
if he becomes convinced that management is correct. The use
of other pressure tactics such as refusal to work overtime, or the
refusal of other employees to perform work assignments would
seem equally incidental to the steward's power to administer the
contract through the settlement of grievances. If, however, the
steward had called his constituents out on strike and had put up a
picket line, a more difficult question would have been presented.
Since the steward represents the union when he acts in an official
capacity, the union should be held responsible for his conduct
even though the methods he uses may seem unreasonable in view
of the availability of the grievance procedure. In this respect the
81 E.g., Oil Workers Int'l v. Superior Court, 103 Cal. App. 2d 512, 280 P. 2d
71 (Dist. Ct. 1951) (speechmaking by president).
82 Ibid.
8 3 Restatement, Agency §229(1) (1958), supra note 70.
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office of steward is no different from that of a committeeman or
higher union officer. The status of a union officer has no bearing
on the reasonableness of the method chosen. His status should
be relevant only to the determination of the kinds of acts which
the union official ordinarily performs. Thus, if the above strike
were for the purpose of negotiating a wage increase, it would
be beyond the steward's scope of authority, but not for the reason
that the method chosen was unreasonable. Most of the conduct
which characterizes the field of labor relations-strikes, picket
lines, and other concerted activities-should ordinarily be con-
sidered reasonable.84 There is no reason why a local union should
be less responsible for activities such as sit-down strikes or
"quickie strikes" merely because these activities are considered
reprehensible by current standards of industrial mores. If, how-
ever, the conduct of the agent of the union goes beyond the
limitations set by the test of excessive criminality, the local union
should be relieved of liability.
5
From this study of the officers and members as agents of the
union it can be seen that the principle of respondeat superior
readily applies. The officers, committeemen, and stewards, but
not the members, are agents of the union. Authorization for a
union official's conduct may be inferred from the fact that union
officials of like rank engage in similar conduct. The officers of a
local union commonly conduct negotiations and organizational
activities; committeemen and stewards commonly administer the
employer-union agreement and enforce membership and dis-
ciplinary policies. Authority may also stem from an express grant
of power by the union or from a clear statement of policy in the
union constitution, by-laws or employer-union agreement. The
scope of this authority can be defined by looking to the time,
place, and purpose of the unauthorized conduct.
C. Local and Intermediate Unions as Agents of the National Union
At the national level a more extensive analysis will be required
to find standards which accurately reflect the distribution of
union power, the interests of employees and employers, and the
84 E.g., see cases collected in Note, "Union Responsibility for Acts of Officers
and Members under the LMRA", 49 Colum. L. Rev. 384, 389 nn.41-44 (1949),
and cases cited supra notes 62, 63, 73, and 77.85 ]Restatement, Agency §229(2) (j) (1958).
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interest of the public. The doctrine of respondeat superior is used
to hold the national union liable when it is in a position of control
over the local union or when it derives benefit from local activi-
ties. In the following discussion, therefore, a theory will first be
formulated which can adequately account for these interests of
the national union but still achieve a fair correlation between
union power and union responsibility. Then the interests of
other parties to the litigation and the public which might require
modification of the theory will be considered.
1. The Interests of the National Union.
The interests of the national union which concern us here are
its interests in the activities of its local and intermediate organiza-
tions which can justify holding it responsible for those activities.
The policies underlying the doctrine of respondeat superior which
have traditionally reflected the interests of the defendant include
control and benefit.8 In this section the relationship between the
local, intermediate, and national unions in terms of benefit and
control will be analyzed in order to formulate a theory which will
be applicable both to the local and the intermediate union as
agents of the national union.
a. Control.
One of the requirements of an agency relationship is that the
agent be subject to the control of the principal. "Control",
according to Professor Seavey, means "the legal coercion capable
of being exercised by the principal through his power of revoking,
diminishing or enlarging the powers granted the agent.18 7 In
our discussion of the relationship between a local union and its
members the fact that the stewards, committeemen and officers
of the local union occupied a defined status in the hierarchy of
union command was sufficient to provide the requisite degree of
such control to support a finding that these officials were agents.
No such hierarchy of command ordinarily exists between the
local and national union. It therefore becomes necessary to
determine the extent to which right of control and actual control
can support a finding of an agency relationship between the local
and national union.
86 Supra note 41.
87 Seavey, "The Rationale of Agency," 29 Yale L.J. 859, 868 n.29 (1920).
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1) Right of Control.
Right of control is found in the constitution and by-laws of
the national union. Mr. Chief Justice Taft, in a dictum from the
leading case of United Mine Workers v. Coronado Coal Com-
pany,"' characterized the relationship between the national and
local union as one of actual agency, which "the constitutions of
the two bodies settle conclusively."89
Although the union constitution may provide a general indica-
tion of the relationship between a local and national union, the
court may choose from a group of provisions common to most
present-day union constitutions only those which support its
decision. For example, the court, in DiGiorgio Fruit Corporation
v. NLRB, 0 relied on the following features of the union con-
stitution to deny that the local union was an agent of the national
union:
The constitution of the National Union shows that the
basic unit in the organization is the local. Each local has its
own offices and its own executive committee. The supreme
governing body of the National is a convention composed
of delegates elected by the locals. Initiation fees and dues
are collected by the local, and designated portions of such
collections are forwarded to the National. The locals enter
into collective bargaining, and the contracts negotiated by
their representatives are submitted to the "vote of the mem-
bership affected by the contract."91
Compare this use of constitutional provisions with the use of
constitutional provisions in two cases involving the question
whether service of process on the local union may subject the
national union to the jurisdiction of the court. In Moran v. Int'l
Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees,92 the court sustained
service of process on the ground that:
The constitution is declared to be the supreme law of
its members and of each Local . . . and Locals hold their
charters only on condition that they recognize the supreme
jurisdiction of the International and accept its constitution
as its fundamental law .... Thus through the constitution
88259 U.S. 344 (1922).
89 Id. at 395.
90191 F. 2d 642 (D.C. Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 869 (1951).
01 Id. at 647.
92 139 N.J. Eq. 561, 52 A. 2d 531 (Ch. 1947).
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a centralized supervision and control of its members and
Locals is maintained by International.... The constitution
authorizes the following activities (among others) in which
the International and its officers claim the right to engage
in dealing with and affecting the affairs of Locals estab-
lished in this state and their membership. The Interna-
tional president may try charges against members in certain
cases and also charges against Locals and he is empowered
to interpret the International constitution and his decisions
are binding on members and Locals. He may order any
Local to exhibit its books and records to him ... and [may]
suspend or revoke a Local's charter.
93
In the second case94 service was quashed:
I have considered carefully the constitution and by-laws
of the different International Unions made defendants
herein . . . and I find nothing in them that justifies the
position that any individual member of any of these unions,
if there be such, or of a local union, or an officer or agent
of a local union, represents the International Union to the
extent that service of process on him will bring it before
the court.95
The inadequacy of reliance upon general constitutional pro-
visions indicates difficulties imposed by inherent limitations in
the provisions themselves. The power of a national union to
revoke a local charter, impose a trusteeship on the local, or dis-
cipline its members for conduct detrimental to the union is
subject to the ultimate political limitation of assent by the mem-
bers of the local to the authority of the national union. These
remedies and devices can be effectively invoked as a practical
matter only when it has become clear that the conduct by the
local or its members is indefensible. Consider, for example, the
power to place the local under an administrator and see how it
has been used in the following example to resolve a wildcat strike
problem created by a dissident local union.
Local 122 of the UAW was born in 1957 when Chrysler
Corporation and the United Auto Workers agreed that the
United Auto Workers could represent employees at the newly
built stamping plant at Twinsburg, Ohio. Members of the new
931d. at 563-64, 52 A. 2d at 533.94 Christian v. IAM, 7 F. 2d 481 (E.D. Ky. 1925).
951d. at 482.
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local consisted both of recruits from the Ohio countryside, many
of whom were not accustomed to working in a unionized plant,
and of employees who had been transferred from the Detroit
area. Many of the Detroit employees came from two of the most
militant UAW local unions in Detroit. Strong and radical leaders
quickly appeared. As they took over, communications with the
international union in Detroit became weak and relations with
the local plant management began to deteriorate. Although there
had been only one unauthorized strike at the Ohio Stamping
Plant in 1957, three occurred in 1958.6 In 1959 six of the forty
unauthorized strikes at Chrysler were called by the leaders of
Local 122.T These six strikes caused a loss of 141,998 manhours,
forty per cent of the total manhours lost due to unauthorized
strikes in Chrysler Corporation plants in 1959.98
The international union remained in good faith with the
company throughout this crisis. During the 1958 negotiations
the director of the UAW Chrysler Department became ill. Walter
Reuther, President of the UAW, placed two of his assistants in
charge of the negotiations, thereby bringing his personal prestige
and the status of his office to bear on the negotiations. These
representatives and the Chrysler negotiators reached an under-
standing concerning production standards and unauthorized
strikes which brought a reduction in the number of unauthorized
strikes throughout the corporation from 512 in 1958 to 40 in
1959."" Despite this good faith, lack of information regarding
the actual state of affairs at the Ohio Stamping Plant and a
personality clash between the Regional Director for Ohio and
central staff representatives made difficult any effective action
short of the installation of an administrator over the local.
The problem was brought to a head when the local manage-
ment discharged the president of the local, the vice-president and
five others for leading a walk-out. The employees walked out
again in protest and refused to work until the officers were rein-
stated. After the exhortations of the remaining local officers
06 During the no-contract period from June 1 through October 22, 1958, seven
other strikes occurred at the Ohio Stamping Plant. These statistics and those in
the following three notes have been obtained from the Chrysler Corporation Labor
Relations Department.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
09ibid.
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failed, the international union finally persuaded the employees
to return to work, but only on the condition that a strike would
be authorized. After the authorized strike was settled, the inter-
national union placed the local under an administrator.
Although the consistent pattern of unlawful conduct by the
local union made clear to all concerned that it was generally
indefensible, the point at which the UAW should have exercised
its right of control cannot be precisely defined. In this case the
UAW should not have been penalized for waiting until the com-
pany exercised its right to discipline its employees, at least not
by the company which had not until this point exercised its own
right of control. Moreover, the public interest in permitting
local unions to administer their own affairs might be thwarted
by a frequent exercise of the national union's trusteeship pro-
vision. This case study illustrates the practical limitations on
general control provisions which limit their value as a source of
the right of control.
If, on the other hand, the court places its reliance on provisions
of the constitution which establish specific controls over local
union conduct, a stronger argument can be made for the use of
these provisions as a basis for finding an agency relationship.
National union constitutions are particularly explicit and detailed
with respect to the discipline of members by the local union. In
International Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union v. Smith'00
the court sustained a damage judgment against a national union
for the expulsion of a member by the local union, noting among
other controls the following:
The laws of the international union provide the mode of
trial to be followed and the manner in which a member may
be fined, suspended, or expelled .... It prescribes the cir-
cumstances under which members may be suspended or
expelled, and requires the secretary of the local union to
make a monthly report of all such suspensions, as well as a
report of those in good standing from whom dues are being
collected, and reserves the right to discharge the secretary
and to expel him from the union for a failure to perform
his duties.' 0 '
100 145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W. 2d 729 (1946).
101 Id. at 406, 198 S.W. 2d at 733.
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Before concluding that a right of control sufficient to support
a finding of agency can be found in specific constitutional pro-
visions, it should be noted that other union activities also
may be regulated in a more or less specific way by the union
constitution. The Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure
Act of 1959 requires every labor organization to adopt a constitu-
tion and by-laws and to file with the Secretary of Labor a copy,
together with a report which shows the provision made and
procedures followed with respect to, inter alia, "(J) authoriza-
tion for bargaining demands, (K) ratification of contract terms,
(L) authorization for strikes....
Similarly, detailed provisions for the regulation of local union
conduct may also be provided in the national employer-union
agreement. The local union may be charged with the detailed
administration of a supplemental unemployment benefit plan, of
a pension plan, or of a labor market pool for the recall of laid-off
employees. The most obvious example of a delegation of detailed
authority is in the authority of the local union to comply with
the grievance procedure at the plant level.
Since it seems clear that a national union could not reason-
ably be held liable for the strikes of a local union merely because
it retains a right to authorize strikes in the national constitution,
nor for breach of contract for every failure of the local union to
comply with the grievance procedure, the fact that a procedure
governing local union conduct is spelled out in detail should not
alone be sufficient to justify the finding of an agency relationship.
Of course, if the detailed course of local union conduct is imposed
by statute or by contract rather than by the union constitution, it
can be argued that no agency relationship should be inferred
because the local union has not consented to the right of the
national union to enforce such detailed provisions. But the diffi-
culty posed by specific provisions concerning local union bargain-
ing activities would still remain.
This difficulty can be resolved only by concluding that specific
constitutional provisions cannot alone determine whether an
agency exists, notwithstanding the Coronado case dictum of Mr.
Chief Justice Taft."°3 If specific provisions are not conclusive,
10273 Stat. 524 (1959), 29 U.S.C. §431(a)(5) (Supp. I, 1959).
103 Supra note 88 and accompanying text.
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then it follows first that the courts are not bound by express dis-
claimers of responsibility by the national union for the acts of the
local,10 4 and secondly that the court can look behind constitutional
provisions providing for a centralized right of control to find that
in fact actual control rests in the local union. 0 5 Since neither
general nor specific constitutional control provisions provide an
adequate basis for determining whether the local union is an
agent of the national union, we must now turn to actual control.
2) Actual Control.
The problem of defining the scope of actual control recently
arose in Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Teamsters Union.06 The
plaintiff alleged that the International Brotherhood completely
dominated and controlled the local unions, joint councils, and con-
ferences through power over membership, discipline, officers,
grievances, business and finance. The court held that, however
sympathetic it might be with such a characterization, judicial
notice could not be taken.' Of course, if it were shown that the
national union had placed the local union under the control of a
trustee, the national would be responsible for the conduct of
agents of the local union just as if it were itself the local union.08
The court in the Morgan case correctly required the plaintiff
to show that the national union dominated the specific local
whose activities were the basis of the complaint because the
degree of general domination sufficient to warrant a finding of
agency cannot be reduced to a test susceptible of judicial applica-
tion. On the other hand, the actual existence of a trusteeship
should not be required to establish an agency on the basis of
104 E.g., Teamsters Constitution, Art. XII, §11 (c) (1946):
Approval or disapproval by the general president of wage scales
or other agreements is not intended to impose any liability on the
international or its officers; and the international does not assume any
liability of any nature to any person or persons for such approval or
disapproval.
See National Industrial Conference Board, supra note 57, at 49-54, which
points out that of 194 constitutions surveyed, 19 constitutions, covering a total
membership of 2,417,452, have "disclaimer of liability" clauses.
105 See Farnsworth & Chambers Co. v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, 125
F. Supp. 830 (D. N.M. 1954).
106 268 F. 2d 871, 876 (7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
107 Id. at 877.
108 Teamsters Local 612, 121 N.L.R.B. 1571 (1958); Teamsters Local 294,
117 N.L.R.B. 1401, 1411 (1957). But see Becker v. Calnan, 313 Mass. 625, 48
N.E. 2d 668, 671 (1943): "But it does not appear that Jennings, although he had
been appointed 'trustee' of the Local, was an officer or agent of the International
within the scope of this policy.... "
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actual control, because the union may control the local union in
fact with no formalities whatever. If the national union is chart-
ing the course of local conduct, it should be held responsible for
activities of the local and its agents which are reasonably
related to that control. Thus actual control, like actual authoriza-
tion, becomes a question largely of fact in each case.
All that will be done here is to suggest what facts might be
sufficient to justify a finding of agency in connection with one
category of local union conduct. Since local collective bargaining
activities are subject to a wide variety of national controls, such
activities may serve as an example. If the participation by the
national union in the local negotiations extends only to the giving
of advice, the national union does not control the local negotia-
tions.109 If the national requires and obtains approval of contract
demands and the final settlement agreement, or if the interna-
tional representatives participate in the local negotiations, an
inference should be permitted that the national is controlling the
negotiations.1 0 Finally, if it can be shown that the national
union is using the local as an instrumentality to further national
objectives through local negotiations, an agency should be found.
With each degree of participation in the collective bargaining
at the local level, the unlawful conduct of the local which can be
reasonably attributed to the national union will vary. If, for
example, the national representatives are participating in the
local negotiations, the torts of union members on the picket line
might be attributable to the national union, whereas if an agency
were established on the basis of national approval of contract
demands and of the ultimate contract settlement, the scope of
national control would not subject it to liability for such conduct.
Since actual control is limited to cases of factual control and
since right of control cannot provide a sound basis for the imposi-
tion of liability on the national union, the control rationale alone
is inadequate.
b. Benefit.
The shortcomings of the control rationale seem to lie primarily
in the fact that home rule precludes the inference that the local
109 See Note, "Union Responsibility for Acts of Ofcers and Members under
the LMRA," 49 Colum. L. Rev. 384, 393-94 (1949).
110 E.g., Chicago Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1949).
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is exercising an agency power merely because the national union
has reserved a right to control certain aspects of its conduct.
Since the local has home rule and therefore cannot be regarded
as commonly engaging in any of its activities on behalf of the
national union, it is necessary to consider together the closely
related question of agency and scope of authority. In the former,
an authorization is construed as a limitation or reservation of
control. In the latter, an authorization is construed as a grant of
power. A grant of power is illusory, however, unless it can be
construed to confer some benefit on the grantor. To illustrate
this point, consider the following example: A authorizes B to
engage in an activity for B's benefit. This grant of authority is
illusory. Suppose that A had also reserved the right to approve
or disapprove of B's conduct. Although A derives a benefit from
this reservation of control, it is submitted that no agency rela-
tionship has yet been created because B is still acting on his
own behalf. It is only when the right reserved by A is exercised
that B can be said to be acting on A's behalf. Since the control
theory thus presupposes a grant which confers a benefit upon
the national union,"' our next step will be to define "benefit"
and to determine the extent to which it can provide a basis for the
application of a control rationale to create an agency relationship.
The concept of a benefit has appeared thus far only in con-
nection with ratification by acceptance of benefits" 2 and the con-
duct of a local union official which furthers a stated union policy
but is not conduct in which he customarily engages on behalf of
the national union."3 The Moran case," 4 from which a quotation
has already been taken to demonstrate reliance upon constitu-
tional provisions," 5 provides an example of a concept of benefit:
The existence of the International as an organization
depends on its several units or agencies called Locals which
are created by and coordinated under the government of
111 See Restatement, Agency §200(1) (1958):
A servant is a person employed to perform services in the affairs
of another and who with respect to the physical conduct in the per-
formance of the services is subject to the other's control or right to
control. [Emphasis added].
112 See text accompanying notes 34-35 supra.
113 See text accompanying note 74 supra.
314 Moran v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 139 NJ. Eq. 561,
52 A. 2d 531 (Ch. 1947).
115 See text accompanying notes 92-93 supra,
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the International and through whom and the membership
whereof the International has being and acts in the achieve-
ment of its and their stated objects. I am of the opinion
that an association which grants rights and imposes duties
on its individual members wherever located and which
claims every state of the Union as its field of operation
through the establishment in those states of component
parts of its organization, by which units or agencies it
engages in activities designed to further the objects for
which it was organized, which objects can be achieved
only through the operation of its units, should be regarded
as voluntarily submitting itself to the jurisdiction of those
states when duly served with process and should not be
permitted to say that it is amenable only to the courts of the
state in which it maintains its headquarters.116
According to this court, the delegation inherent in the charter
confers sufficient benefit upon the national union to subject it to
the jurisdiction of the court when a local union is served on its
behalf. Although the beneficial interest of the national union in
the existence of the local may be sufficient to support service of
process, it would be unfair to the national union to use such a
broad test for the imposition of substantive liability.
The concept of ratification by acceptance of benefits is more
useful. The fact that a local may confer a benefit on a national
union is not alone sufficient to impose liability on the national
union, but if the conduct benefits a clear and definite policy of
the national union, the national union has the duty to disavow
the conduct. If, however, activities of the local union furthered
a clear and definite policy where the national union had a right
to control the local union, the combination of benefit and control
might be sufficient to create an agency relationship which would
impose liability on the national union without regard to whether
it has disavowed the conduct of the local union. It is upon this
basis that a steward can bind a local union for acts which further
an expressly stated policy of the local union but which are not
acts that he commonly does. The steward is subject to the control
of the local union. His conduct in furtherance of a clearly
defined purpose of the local union comes within his authority.
Because he is subject to the control of the union and hence is an
116 Moran v. Int'l Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees, 139 N.J. Eq. 561,
52 A. 2d 531, 533-34 (Ch. 1947).
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agent, his conduct need not be a "substantial contribution" to the
local policy in order to bind the union.
Since the local union may be subjected to varying degrees of
control by the national union, both control and benefit must be
weighed together to justify holding the national union responsible.
Although elements of both control and benefit must be present,
a substantial benefit would reduce the degree of control required.
Conversely, as the elements of control increase, the furtherance
of less specific and less immediate policies would provide sufficient
benefit.
This approach can be illustrated by a consideration of two
cases, each involving a violation of section 8(b) (3) of the
National Labor Relations Act.117 Section 8(b) (3) prohibits the
bargaining representative from refusing to bargain collectively
with an employer. In Westmoreland Coal Company,"" a local
union went on strike. The company contended that the failure of
either the international or local to file a statutory strike notice
with the Board pursuant to section 8(d) of the act constituted a
violation of section 8(b) (3). The Board held that since the
international union, the certified bargaining representative, had
"delegated" the administration of the local grievance procedure
and seniority arrangements to the local union, and since the strike
arose in connection with a seniority dispute, it was within the
scope of authority of the local union as agent of the international.
The Board went on, however, to relieve the international because
of its good faith attempt to settle the strike.
In this case, if the local union were actually an agent, acting
within the scope of its authority, the international's attempt to
settle the strike should not have relieved it of liability for the acts
of the local union. The delegation of bargaining functions was
illusory because the local union would have engaged in grievance
handling and administration of the seniority arrangements on its
own behalf in the absence of any delegation. The fact that the
employer-union agreement may have spelled out the grievance
procedure in some detail would not have been sufficient to
attribute the strike to the national union since the contract could
117 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (3) (1958).
118 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957), modified on other grounds, sub nom. Local
1Jio= 9735, UMWA v. NLRB, 258 F. 2d 146 (DC. Cir. 1958),
[Vol. 49,
1961] THE LAW OF AGENCY AND T= NATIONAL UNION 331
establish no right of control over the local. Assuming, however,
that the UMW constitution contains adequate provision to obtain
local compliance with the grievance procedure, there still should
have been no declaration of agency in the absence of any indica-
tion that the local union's administration of the seniority program
was making effective a policy in which the national union was in-
terested. Seniority arrangements have been traditionally local in
nature.
In the Chicago Typographical Union,119 on the other hand,
the Board found that the national union had violated section
8(b) (3) through local negotiations which implemented the ITU
1947 "Collective Bargaining Policy" in a manner that avoided
"the making of any bilateral agreement, written or oral, with
respect to any matters properly the subject of negotiation and
agreement." 120 The constitution of the national union required
and the national in fact obtained approval of contract demands
and of the negotiated contracts. Here, although the ITU had not
participated in any local negotiations, the finding that it had
refused to bargain in good faith was justified by the implementa-
tion of its policies and its retention of control.
From these two cases it can be seen that the determination
of what degree of national interest is sufficient to hold the
national union responsible for the conduct of its local unions is
essentially one of policy. The principles of control and benefit
merely provide tools for the expression of the policy. Control
provisions vary from general provisions for the discipline of
employees and for imposition of trusteeships to specific provisions
requiring approval of contracts and demands in connection with
collective bargaining or compliance with a specified procedure
in the discipline of employees.
The beneficial interest of the national union can also vary
widely. In the collective bargaining area, for example, the
interest may be express and clearly stated, as in the Chicago
Publishers cases, or it may be indirect, as in the case where the
local strike at the Ford plant forced the reopening of the Ford-
119 86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1949).
120 Id. at 1042. See United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 41 CCH
Lab. Cas. 16,658 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (mere reservation of right to approve work
rules held insufficient to subject the national union to liability for unlawful
application of rule where no national program could be found).
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UAW national contract. Although there are some issues which
are clearly of national importance because of their novelty, such
as the pension issues prevalent in 1950, the supplemental unem-
ployment benefit plans of 1955, and the shorter work week and
profit sharing plans of 1958 in the auto industry, other issues rise
and fall in importance to the national union with the ebb and
flow of collective bargaining in the industry. Presently questions
of subcontracting, severance pay, moving expenses, and other
methods of accommodating the work force to the impact of
automation are becoming increasingly important. The recent bat-
tle over work rules in the steel industry and the nationwide
struggle over production standards during the past few years
have given increased importance to disputes arising over time
study and work assignment methods. Although seniority arrange-
ments have long been of primarily local concern, even these may
become nationally significant as schemes are devised to protect
the technologically unemployed worker by providing him with a
companywide and perhaps even an industrywide seniority base.
The application of these control and benefit factors to the
cases is difficult because the status of the national union is ill-
defined. The foregoing discussion does at least suggest an
approach to the problem. We should start with the presumption
that the local union is acting on its own behalf and not on behalf
of the national union. Such a presumption not only takes account
of the fact that the local union does in fact run its own affairs but
also reflects the public policy encouraging union democracy and
hence local control. In order to establish an agency relationship
the national union should be shown to have actual control over
the local union or to have a right to control and a clearly defined
beneficial interest in the activities of the local.
Although it may be impossible to conclude abstractly when
the pattern of control and benefit should impose liability on the
national union, situations like those presented in the Chicago
Typographical Union case on the one hand and the Chrysler-
UAW strike problem on the other can be quickly decided. In
addition to providing an approach to the gray area between these
clear cases the control-benefit analysis may provide a basis for
considering the role of the intermediate union as an agent of the
national union,
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c. Intermediate Unions as Agents of the National Union.
The growth of national industries and concomitant growth of
the national union have made necessary the development of inter-
mediate bodies. Although some of the larger unions do not
charter more than one local in each city, most national unions
have created intermediate bodies.
The intermediate union organization may perform a variety of
functions. Its usual duty is to handle collective bargaining for a
geographical area or industrial group; it may take over the func-
tion of organizing the unorganized; it may play an important
role in the union's disciplinary procedure, or perform service
functions, such as the administration of company and union
welfare plans or the representation of union interests in local
politics. In order to obtain a more complete picture of the types
of intermediate unions and their functions, it should be helpful
to note briefly their role in the building trades, auto, mining,
clothing and transportation unions.
The building trades unions are usually compelled to join the
local district trades council. The district trades council is not an
intermediate organization because it is formed by local unions
which are members of different international unions.'' These
councils ordinarily conduct local political and public relations
activities. The Carpenters, Painters, and Hod Carriers have
strong intermediate unions.122 These organizations function in
local areas where a number of local unions require coordination.
To a large extent, the intermediate Carpenters and Painters
organizations perform this function through areawide bargain-
i 2g.1 3 Since the Hod Carriers Union cuts cross industry lines,
the intermediate organization is less a coordinating body than a
device for securing international control over local unions.
The UAW has established regional district directors, corpora-
tion conferences, and central departments for each major corpora-
tion represented by the international union. The regional direc-
tors do not have authority to intervene in local union affairs.
121 E.g., State or local central bodies are excluded from the definition of
'labor organization" under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959, 73 Stat. 520, 29 U.S.C. §402 (Supp. I, 1959).
122 See Lahne, "The Intermediate Union Body in Collective Bargaining," 6
Ind. & Lab. Rel. Rev. 163 (1953).
123 Leiserson, American Trade Union Democracy 318 (1959).
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They stand solely in an advisory capacity to the international
union. The corporation departments play a large role in labor
relations at the corporate level. They are charged with the
administration of the corporate agreement and with the settle-
ment of problems which become too large for the local unions to
handle. These departments also negotiate the bargaining agree-
ments with their respective corporations pursuant to policies
established by the corporation conferences consisting of delegates
from the local unions and from the central staff.
The United Mine Workers was the first American union to
establish strong intermediate bodies. When John L. Lewis be-
came president of the Mine Workers, the structure of the union
resembled that of a federation of autonomous districts. He
gradually changed it to a highly centralized national administra-
tion by exercising his powers under the constitution but without
changing the constitution. 24 He suspended either the charters
of the districts or the requirement that district officers be elected
by their membership and then appointed officers until he gained
complete control over the board and the districts.
The International Ladies Garment Workers' Union has estab-
lished joint boards and district councils in the concentrated indus-
trial areas. All local unions in the same branch of the industry in
an area are required to become allied with the joint board.12 All
of the local unions in any given area which are not members of
the joint board may join district councils, which cut across the
divisions in the trades.
The Teamsters are presently going through a process of
centralization of power like that of the Mine Workers. 26 Concen-
tration of decision-making power has become particularly pro-
nounced in the western and central states conferences. Under
the present trend the joint councils are assuming the largest part
of the bargaining and organizational authority traditionally exer-
cised by the local unions. 27
The variety of intermediate organizations and their functions
tends to defy judicial classification. An intermediate body can
be acting either as principal in furtherance of objects for which
124 Id. at 243.
125 Id. at 307.
126Leiter, The Teamster Union 72 (1957).
127 Ibid,
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it was established or as agent for either local or national unions.
District trades councils are not agents of a national union because
they are not in any way involved in the chain of national union
command. Intermediate bodies like those in the skilled building
trades which perform the function of removing the possibility of
wage competition between local unions of the same trade in a
local market area do not usually act at the direction of or on
behalf of the national union. However, where the intermediate
organization is used primarily to obtain national control over the
local unions, as in the Hod Carriers, or when the leaders of the
intermediate body are on the payroll of the national union, the
intermediate body should be regarded as an agent of the national
union.
The status of the intermediate organization in the United
Mine Workers, Ladies Garment Workers, and Teamsters Unions
is made more clear by the cases. The districts of the Mine
Workers have generally been considered to be agents of the
international. 2 8 One exhaustive opinion has held a joint board of
the Ladies Garment Workers to be an agent of the international
union.129 These cases emphasized the fact that these particular
intermediate organizations have no independent constitutions and
the fact that the heads of the intermediate bodies are appointed
by the international union. The joint councils and conferences
of the Teamsters, on the other hand, have been held not to be
agents of the International Brotherhood. 130
Although these cases have drawn a bright line around con-
stitutional right to control and the actual control manifested in
128 Mile Branch Coal Co. v. UMW, 266 F. 2d 919, 921 (D.C. Cir. 1959);
UMW v. Meadow Creek Coal Co., 263 F. 2d 52 (6th Cir. 1959), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1013 (1959) (agency for service of process); Lewis v. Benedict Coal
Corp., 259 F. 2d 346 (6th Cir. 1958), modified on other grounds, 361 U.S. 459
(1960); Garmeada Coal Co. v. UMW, 230 F. 2d 945 (6th Cir. 1956); UMW v.
Patton, 211 F. 2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954); Claycraft Co. v. UMW, 204 F. 2d 600
(6th Cir. 1953) (agency for service of process); United Constr. Workers v.
Laburnum Constr. Corp., 194 Va. 872, 75 S.E. 2d 694 (1953), aff'd, 347 U.S. 656
(1954).
120 Spica v. Int'l Ladies Garment Workers' Union, 388 Pa. 882, 130 A. 2d
468 (1957) (agency for service of process). See Quinn v. Pershing, 367 Pa. 426,
80 A. 2d 712 (1951) (agency for service of process). But cf. In the Matter of
Western Union Telegraph Co., 206 Misc. 561, 133 N.Y.S. 2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1954)
(service on regional director not sufficient to bind national union); Seafarer's
Intl Union, 100 N.L.R.B. 1176 (1952) (district business agent not agent of
national union).
130 Morgan Drive Away, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 268 F. 2d 871, 875-76
(7th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 896 (1959).
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the international's appointment of the heads of the district organi-
zations, these factors alone are not sufficient to achieve a proper
redistribution of responsibility for other newer and less mature
national organizations which are gaining power and control
through the implementation of their policies by intermediate
bodies. Constitutional development has not kept pace with the
rapid development of intermediate bodies in these organiza-
tions.13 1 The United Electrical Workers Union, for example, has
established full-blown conference boards of which no mention
is made in the constitution of the union.
Even in the absence of specific constitutional authorization
and control the clauses providing for right of control over
local unions may be applied to intermediate organizations.
The home rule features which characterize the local union are not
present at the intermediate level and there is less danger that
public policy demanding the protection of member rights through
the preservation of local control will be thwarted. Given these
right of control provisions, the benefit derived by the national
union from the activities of the intermediate body can readily be
identified. Since the activities of the intermediate body are
necessarily broader in scope, there is a greater likelihood that the
national union's interest in its day-to-day activities may be
sufficient to constitute the intermediate body an agent of the
national. The Teamster conferences, for example, might easily
be found to be agents of the International Brotherhood. More-
over, the intermediate body is a convenient device for the
achievement of uniform administration of national policies. When-
ever the activities of the intermediate organization are directed
to this end, the unauthorized conduct of the representatives of
the intermediate body incidental to such activities should be
deemed within the scope of authority conferred by the national
union.
The ease with which a benefit-control approach can be
adapted to the intermediate union suggests that it may be a valid
and perhaps useful technique for determining when the national
union should be held responsible for the acts of its subordinate
organizations. Where the national union does in fact have
actual control or when a clearly defined national union policy is
l31 Lahne, supra note 122, at 177-78.
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furthered by local union activities over which the national has a
right of control, liability should be imposed. In these situations
the national union should not be permitted to benefit from unlaw-
ful conduct resulting from its failure to perform its obligation to
exercise its right of control. There may, however, be other
sources of the obligation of the national union to control the
activities of its subordinate organizations. For example, the na-
tional union would not seem to derive in fact any greater benefit
from the administration of disciplinary provisions of the national
constitution by the local than from other local activities which
may be equally circumscribed, such as the right of a local to strike
without obtaining approval from the national union. Yet the
courts find that the local union is an agent of the national for
the purpose of administering disciplinary provisions of the union
constitution'3 2 but not for the purpose of local strike activities.
To account for these cases, the national union should be examined
from another perspective, that of the public and the parties in-
jured by the wrongful conduct of the agent of the national union.
2. The Interests of the Plaintiff and the Public.
The balance between the interests of the national union and
those who litigate against it reflects underlying public policy in
the field of labor relations. Because this field is new and volatile,
public policy lies close to the surface of labor law. From the
viewpoint of the national union the most influential declaration
of public policy has been the Wagner Act of 1935.133 This act,
through government recognition and protection of unions and the
institution of collective bargaining, has completely reoriented the
American labor movement, and with it, the role of the national
union.3 Since the establishment, growth, and power of such
national unions as the United Auto Workers, the United Steel-
13 2 See cases cited in Intl Printing Pressmen & Assistants' Union v. Smith,
145 Tex. 399, 198 S.W. 2d 729, 734 (1946); Witmer, "Trade Union Liability-
The Problem of the Unincorporated Association," 51 Yale L.J. 40, 48 (1941). But
see Madden v. Atldns, 4 N.Y. 2d 283, 151 N.E. 2d 73 (1958), where the court did
not hold the national union responsible even though the president of the local
union was also president of the national and had failed to act on an appeal from
the aggrieved member.
133 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450 (1935), as amended, 61 Stat.
136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141-82 (1958).
134 See Dunlop, "Structural Changes in the American Labor Movement and
Industrial Relations System," Proceedings of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the
Industrial Research Association. December 1956.
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workers and United Rubber Workers can be attributed directly
to changes wrought by the Wagner Act,13 the public might
reasonably expect the national union to use its power for the
protection of important public interests in the field of labor rela-
tions, without regard to the presence of direct and immediate
benefit to the national union.
We have noted the public interest in preserving union
democracy through local control. Just as this concern is reflected
in the control-benefit approach to the relationship between a
national union and its subordinate organizations, other public
policies may be reflected through the interests of the plaintiff.
The claims of those who sue a national union for the activities
of its local union may be classified according to the context in
which they arise, as follows:
1) claims not arising in a context of labor relations activity;
2) claims arising out of a labor relations activity not inci-
dental to an established collective bargaining relation-
ship;
3) claims arising out of an established collective bargain-
ing relationship; and
4) claims arising out of union membership.
Claims against the union may also be classified according
to the purpose or means of the local activity. Labor law history
teaches us, however, that lawful and unlawful purposes cannot
readily be distinguished by judicial tribunals. The "objectives
test" has long been controverted because it permits the court to
articulate as a basis of decision policies upon which there is no
substantial agreement among the public. 36 That the means em-
ployed by the union can no more than its purposes be subjected
to discerning judicial or quasi-judicial analysis has been recently
pointed out by the United States Supreme Court in NLRB v.
Insurance Agents" International Union.'3" This case held that the
NLRB did not have the power to find union work tactics designed
to harass the management into conceding to union demands
during the negotiation of a collective bargaining agreement in
135 National Labor Relations Act, 49 Stat. 450 (1985), as amended, 61 Stat.
186 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §141-82 (1958).
136 American News Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 1802, 1810 (1944) (dictum).
137 861 U.S. 477 (1960).
[Vol. 49,
1961] TAE LAW OF AGENCY AND THE NATIONAL UNION 889
violation of the union's duty to bargain in good faith. Because
of these difficulties in the application of a means and purpose
classification, the objective-means approach must be rejected.
a. Non-Labor Relations Activities.
Returning then to our original classification, the first category
of claims would include negligence, contract claims, or other
causes of action not peculiar to the field of labor relations. For
example, the plaintiff may be injured by an automobile accident
involving a business agent of the local union acting within the
scope of his employment2 8 or he may be litigating to recover
for a refusal to compensate him for legal services rendered to the
local union.139 These activities of the labor union only fortui-
tously involve the union. No greater public interest is involved
than in similar cases arising in other contexts; hence there is no
need to apply broader rules to the national union in this category
of cases.
b. Labor Relations Activities.
The second category of cases includes common law torts
which arise in a labor relations context and violations of sections
8(b) (1), 8(b) (4) and 8(b) (7) of the NLRA.'4 0 These activities
may be directed at employers, employees, or misdirected at in-
nocent third parties. The plaintiff may be a nonstriking employee
who is roughed up on the picket line, an employer whose dry-
cleaning establishment has been bombed by an agent of the local
union, or an employer who has suffered loss through an unlawful
picket line in front of his store. The harm may be physical injury
to the plaintiff, damage to his property, or loss to his business.
The activity which causes the injury may arise from a strike,
picket line, or boycott made unlawful either because of its pur-
pose or because of the manner in which it has been conducted.
Within this category several distinctions may be suggested as
a basis for formulating a different agency rule applicable to the
national union. First, physical injury or threat of injury to the
person or his property could be ranked higher in the public
138 Ford v. United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners, 315 P. 2d 299 (Wash.
1957), supra note 25.
139 FitzSimmons v. IAM, 125 Conn. 490, 7 A. 2d 448 (1939).
140 61 Stat. 140-41 (1947), as amended, 73 Stat. 542-44 (1959), 29 U.S.C.
§158 (Supp. I, 1959).
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interest than economic damage to the employer's business. Other
concerns falling within the police power of the state might
warrant consideration, for example, state interest in minimizing
strikes in quasi-public industries. Secondly, the fact that different
remedies are made available to the injured parties may reflect a
similar public concern, for example, the availability of damages
to the employer for violations of section 8(b) (4) of the National
Labor Relations Act.141
Of these, the distinction based on the quality of injury
sustained by the plaintiff seems the most tenable. Federal law
has recognized this distinction by preserving state jurisdiction
over activities of state concern, even though violations of section
8(b) (1), e.g. mass picketing,142 may be found. Although the
recognition of both state and federal interests may reflect the
need for local and direct control over conduct which threatens
the public peace or injury to person or property, it does not sup-
port the conclusion that the national union should provide this
control. First, the public interest in threats, violence, and other
conduct coming within the police power of the state has long
been reflected in tort and agency rules. The fact that such con-
duct occurs in a labor relations context should not increase state
concern. On the other hand, if the state were concerned with the
economic impact of the strike rather than the danger posed to
public peace by physical conduct, another objection becomes
apparent. If liability were made commensurate with the state
interest, an unequal and unfair burden would be imposed on
the union. National unions in the power industry, for example,
are no more capable of preventing strikes than are other unions.
Secondly, whether the state concern is with damage to person or
with the economic impact on the community, to make a dis-
141 Ibid.
142UAW v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 336 U.S. 245 (1949)
(Briggs-Stratton Co.). But see NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S.
477, 493 n.23 (1960), citing San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359
U.S. 236, 245 (1959), as having overruled the Briggs-Stratton approach to pre-
emption. The state court, under Frankfurter's majority view in Gannon, would
have jurisdiction only when it is clear that the activity is neither prohibited nor
protected. Id. at 244-45. But since four judges concurred only on the ground that
the peaceful picketing therein was arguably protected, whether the Court would
apply Gannon in situations presenting a stronger state interest is uncertain. In any
event, the Frankfurter opinion still recognizes that the state may retain jurisdiction
to prevent violence and imminent threats to public order. Id. at 247-48.
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tinction based on the scope of the state police power would intro-
duce complex problems of federalism into the law of agency.
Apart from particular considerations given to state interests,
it is difficult to see any distinction between violations of section
8(b) (1) and violations of section 8(b) (4). Section 8(b) (4) (ii)
similarly makes it an unfair labor practice to "threaten, coerce,
or restrain any person engaged in commerce" for the purpose of
accomplishing one of the objectives proscribed by section 8(b)
(4) .'4 If threats or coercion cannot be employed, it would follow
that no distinction should be made where the union violates
section 8(b) (4) (i) by inducing or encouraging "any individual
employed by any person" to engage in a strike or refusal in the
course of business to handle the goods of another.144 Since an
employer's plant can be shut down and his employees put out of
work in violation of section 8(b) (7)145 just as quickly by "signal
picketing" for recognition as by unlawful strikes and boycotts
under section 8(b) (4), such picketing should be placed in the
same category as violations of sections 8(b)(1) and 8(b)(4).
The fact that damages are available for violations of section
8(b) (4) but not for violations of sections 8(b) (1) and 8(b) (7)
does reflect a distinction in remedial policy, but this would seem
to be outweighed by the advantage of formulating uniform rules
of agency to govern the primary conduct.
If it is conceded that the interests of the union and those of
employees, employers, and third parties are of the same general
quality with respect to this category of labor union activities, it
follows that no particular consideration should be given to the
individual interests of the plaintiff in terms of the law of agency
to be applied to the national union. Moreover, since these activi-
ties encompass such a large proportion of the activities of the
local union, any exception would cut deeply into the control-
benefit analysis suggested above. Although this may not be a
valid objection, the fact that no particular interests can be singled
out for special treatment would make difficult, if not impossible,
the formulation of any other limitation on the liability of the
14373 Stat. 542, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(4) (Supp. I, 1959), amending 61 Stat.
140 (1947).
144 Ibid.
145 73 Stat. 544, 29 U.S.C. §158(b)(7) (Supp. I, 1959).
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national union in the area of strikes, picketing, and boycotts,
whether directed at employers or employees. Thus the control-
benefit approach should suffice in this second category of labor
union activities.
c. Activities Incidental to an Established
Collective Bargaining Relationship.
The third category of labor union activities include violations
of the employer-union contract, sections 8(b) (2), 8(b) (3), 8(d),
and the duty to provide fair representation implied from section
9 (a) of the act.146 The established bargaining relationship which
creates these duties is one in which the union has been certified
as bargaining representative by the NLRB or one in which an
employer has granted de facto recognition to the union for the
purpose of representing his employees in collective bargaining,
even though neither party has sought a certification.
The interests of the employer and the employees vis-ht-vis
the union may be clearly differentiated in the collective bargain-
ing relationship. The employer and the union are placed in an
arm's length position to create their own private law of industrial
relations. 41 The union, on the other hand, is a fiduciary vis-a-vis
the employees it represents. 48
A common violation of the employer-union contract by the
local is a breach of a no-strike clause. If the contract is signed
only by the local union, the employer cannot recover against the
national union.'49 On the other hand, if the contract is signed by
the national union, the employer can recover on the contract for
a breach by a local union if he can establish that an agency
14661 Stat. 140-41 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§158(b) (2)-(3) and 158(d)
(1958). The duty to provide fair representation has been found in the Railway
Labor Act, §2 (Fourth) 44 Stat. 578 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §152(Fourth)
(1958); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R. 323 U.S. 192 (1944); National Labor
Relations Act §9(a), 49 Stat 453 (1935), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §159(a)(1958); Syres v. Oil Workers Union, 350 U.S. 892, reversing p3er curiam, 223 F.
2d 739 (5th Cir. 1955); Wallace Corp. v. NLRB, 323 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1944).
147 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 361 U.S. 477 (1960).
148 Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 202-03 (1944). We hold
that the language of the Act ... expresses the aim of Congress to impose on the
bargaining representative of a craft or class of employees the duty to exercise
fairly the power conferred upon it in behalf of all those for whom it acts, without
hostile discrimination against them."
149 Square D Co. v. United Elec. Workers, 123 F. Supp. 776 (E.D. Mich.
1954); Intl Plainfield Motor Co. v. Local 343, UAW, 123 F. Supp. 683 (D. N.J.
1954); Streib v. Int'l Bhd. of Boilermakers, 67 S.W. 2d 806 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934)
(contract with business agent).
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exists.1 50 The contract itself does not establish the agency rela-
tionship but merely places upon the national union a duty to act.
The union's failure to act becomes an authorization of the conduct
by the local union and hence a breach of the national contract.
There are two reasons why the employer-union contract should
not be deemed to create an agency relationship by operation of
law in the absence of an express assumption of strict liability by
the union. First, since the employer and the union are presumed
to have equal standing to bargain, the parties can and should
create their own mutual obligations. Secondly, the employer has
available the remedy of self-help. He may discipline the mem-
bers and leaders of local unions who participate in strikes in
violation of the contract, because such activities are unprotected
by the NLRA. Disciplinary action has long been recognized as
the most effective means of controlling such unlawful action, 151
and therefore, the incentive for the employer to discipline should
not be reduced by giving the employer a preferred position
against the national union.
If the unlawful conduct by the local union takes place during
negotiations rather than during the term of a contract, the
employer may contend that the local's activities violate sections
8(b) (3) and 8(d) of the NLRA. 52 Section 8(d) requires the
employer and representatives of the union to "meet at reasonable
times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of
an agreement, or any question arising thereunder."'53
When the local union is the certified bargaining representative
and is nominally conducting the negotiations in its own behalf,
it would seem difficult to hold the national union liable for
refusing to bargain in good faith. The Board has surmounted
this difficulty in several ways. In one case it found that the
national union was an agent of the local union. 54 In another it
150 Cox, "Some Aspects of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 1947," 61
Harv. L. Rev. 274, 311 (1948); cases cited note 128 supra. Compare United
Packinghouse Workers v. Maurer-Neuer, Inc., 272 F. 2d 647 (10th Cir. 1959),
cert. denied, 362 U.S. 904 (1960) (national union signatory to contract contended
it was acting as agent for local).
151 Mangum, "Taming Wildcat Strikes," 38 Harv. Bus. Rev. 88 (1960). For
a more complete discussion, see Mangum, Wildcat Strikes and Other Pressure
Tactics, October 1959 (unpublished thesis in Widener Library, Cambridge, Mass.).152 61 Stat. 141-42 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§158(b)(3), 158(d) (1958).
153 Ibid.
154 DuQuoin Packing Co., 117 N.L.R.B. 670 (1957).
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held the national union liable as a principal because its policies
were being implemented through the local negotiations. 55
On the other hand, where the national union is the certified
bargaining representative, the Board has held in Westmoreland
Coal Company,15 6 discussed above, that if the local conducts the
negotiations, it must do so as an agent of the national union. In
the Westmoreland case, however, the Board declined to hold
that the national union had refused to bargain in good faith. If
any conclusion were to be drawn from these cases, it would be
that the statutory certification should be disregarded for the
purpose of determining whether an agency exists, since the Board
in all of these cases looked to see whether the national controlled
and derived a benefit from the conduct of negotiations by the
local union before imputing the locals conduct to the national
union.
The control-benefit approach adequately reflects the public's
concern for the creation of an atmosphere in which an arm's
length bargain can be made between an employer and a union.
The recent approval in the Insurance Agent' case of the use of
harassing tactics such as work stoppages during negotiations
point toward a minimal use of section 8(b) (8) to restrict the use
of economic power by the union during negotiations.'1 7 Although
it seems likely that the courts will make more extensive use of
section 8(b) (3) to restrict union activities for improper objec-
tives under the section, Professor Cox suggests that the course
most consonant with the purposes of the act would be "to reject
all new attempts to limit the phrase 'terms or conditions of
employment,' thus reading it to embrace every stipulation which
management or labor might advance not inconsistent with a
federal statute or declared public policy."" 8 Under the con-
struction given to section 8(b) (8) either by Professor Cox or
by the Supreme Court in the Insurance Agent' case,15 9 the
limitations imposed by the section would not seem to require
155 Chicago Typographical Union, 86 N.L.R.B. 1041 (1949). Cf. Boone
County Coal Corp., 117 N.L.R.B. 1095 (1957). (national union liable for failing
to disavow local strike).
156 117 N.L.R.B. 1072 (1957).
157 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Union, 861 U.S. 477 (1960).
158 Cox, "The Labor Decisions of the Supreme Court, October Term, 1957,"
44 Va. L. Rev. 1057, 1086 (1958).
159 NLRB v. Insurance Agents' Int'l Vpion, 801 U.S, 477 (1960).
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greater control by the national than that imposed by the benefit-
control approach.
Section 8(b) (2) proscribes union efforts to cause an employer
to encourage or discourage membership in a labor organization
by discriminating in hire, or terms or conditions of employment.
It makes equally unlawful union tactics designed to discriminate
against employees because of union membership or nonmember-
ship for any reason other than the failure to pay periodic dues
and initiation fees under lawful union shop agreements. The
Mallory case, 160 discussed above in connection with the status of
stewards as agents,'-' presents a good example of employer
coercion. There, it will be recalled, the local stewards led a
strike to compel the discharge of a nonunion employee because
of his prior membership in a communist-dominated union. Ex-
cept for the unlawful purpose of this strike, it was to the
employer no different from strikes for other purposes, and hence
he should have been entitled to no greater protection by the
national union. The fact that a more binding rule in this instance
may indirectly protect the employee discriminated against is not
sufficient to justify a stronger rule here because other sections of
the act, e.g., section 8(b) (4) (ii) (D) (prohibiting restrictive
work assignments), also may provide similar indirect protection
to employees. 6 2
From the employee's point of view union coercion of an
employer to discriminate against the employee constitutes a
violation of section 8(b)(1) as well as section 8(b)(2), even
though no acts of force or violence are involved. 63 Whenever the
discrimination is with respect to the terms and conditions of
employment, the violation of section 8(b) (2) will necessarily
involve the employer. Aside from attempting to cause the em-
ployer to discriminate, the union alone can discriminate against
an employee only with respect to admission or suspension from
the union.
Several arguments can be adduced in support of placing a
duty on the national union to protect the rights of employees
160 237 F. 2d 437 (7th Cir. 1956).
161 Note 64 supra and accompanying text.
102 73 Stat. 542-43, 29 U.S.C. §158(b) (4) (H) (D) (Supp. I, 1959).
103 NLRB v. Philadelphia Iron Works, 211 F. 2d 937 (3rd Cir. 1954).
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represented by its local union. First, the union has a duty to
provide fair representation for its employees. If there is a duty
to provide fair representation in regard to the terms and condi-
tions of employment, it may be argued, a fortiori, that a similar
duty exists under section 8(b) (2). Second, the national union
is in a better position than any other body to protect employees
in an established bargaining relationship from discrimination by
the acts of the local union. Third, since the relief sought by the
employee consists only of reinstatement and back pay, the cost
to the national union would be small.
The arguments against requiring the national union to be
responsible for discriminatory local conduct are more persua-
sive. First, neither the duty of fair representation nor the
duty not to discriminate with respect to membership reflect a
basic concern of the common law with the rights of the minority
employee. At common law an employee could recover from the
union for discriminating against him only when membership in
the union was not open to him on reasonable terms.6 4 The com-
mon law rule permitted the union to take steps to remove the
threat of the non-union employee to the competitive position of
the union and thereby to restrict the fruits of union effort to
union members. 6 5 Despite the statutory certification of the union
as the exclusive representative, these economic justifications for
action against the non-union employee are still present. There-
fore, so long as the employee makes no contribution to the sup-
port of the national union and does not desire to become a
union member, he should not be entitled to rely on protection of
his statutory rights by the national union. If he does want to
become a member of the union but the union's discriminatory
conduct persists, he should be remitted to the common law
where it is arguable that the national union should be held
responsible. Assuming that the national union could be held
responsible as a matter of state law, the common law should not
be extended by the NLRB as a "common law rule of agency" to
require relief from the national because of the administrative
reasons set forth below.
164 Restatement, Torts §810 (1939).
165 Wellington, "Union Democracy and Fair Representation: Federal Re-
sponsibility in a Federal System," 67 Yale L.. 1327, 1334 (1958).
[Vol. 49,
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Second, although the national union may be in a better
position than other bodies to protect the employees represented
by its local unions, the discrimination against employees in sec-
tion 8(b) (2) is so closely related to the other types of conduct
proscribed by the act that a separate rule could not be adequately
administered."6 Discrimination against employees in many cases
will involve coercion concerning employees' terms and conditions
of employment. Only the object of this coercion differentiates it
from the union activities proscribed by other portions of the act.
The object alone of coercive tactics in violation of section
8(b) (2) is not sufficient to offset the administrative inconveni-
ence of following a more strict rule because the relief which
could be obtained from the national union would be little. The
fact that there would be little cost to the national union would
reduce the likelihood that the union would exercise its control to
deter discrimination.
In respect to the duty of the union to provide adequate
representation for its employees, the inability of the courts to
formulate standards implementing the duty of fair representation
in a manner that would vindicate the rights of individual em-
ployees arising out of the administration of the collective bar-
gaining agreement limits the utility of any new rule. Since the
problem here is one of balancing an undefined employee right
against the disadvantages of judicial intervention in the bargain-
ing process, perhaps it would be best not to impose a vicarious
responsibility on the national union until the duty could be
defined with sufficient clarity to permit effective deterrent action
by the national.
On the other hand, if a greater duty were placed on the
national union to provide fair representation, this duty could be
sufficiently distinguished from other duties imposed by the act to
be susceptible of independent administrative application. This
duty is imposed upon the union alone, whereas the duty not to
discriminate imposed by section 8(b) (2) is also imposed on the
employer under section 8(a) (3). Since the policy against judicial
intervention in union internal affairs has been substantially
180 See, e.g., United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners v. NLRB, 41 CCH Lab.
Cas. 916658 (D.C. Cir. 1961) (national union sought to be held for viola-
tions of §8(b)(4)(A) and §8(b)(2) as a result of local union activity concerning
employment of nonunion employees at common situs).
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weakened by Title I of the Labor Management Disclosure Act
of 1959,167 which permits union members to litigate their rights
after four months, the balance probably tips toward holding the
national union responsible for the activities of its locals which
violate the statutory duty to provide fair representation to its
members, but not for activities in violation of section 8(b) (2).
d. Activities Arising Out of Union Membership.
The foregoing arguments against holding the national union
responsible for violations of unfair labor practices arising out of
an established bargaining relationship do not apply when the
employee seeks to enforce a private right against the union for
discrimination with respect to his membership in a union. If the
local is deemed an agent for the purpose of expelling and
suspending its members,'68 it should be so regarded when mem-
bership is unlawfully refused to an employee at common law.
With respect to its members the union has, in addition to the
duty to provide fair representation imposed by statute, the
fiduciary duty created by the membership status. Although the
courts have rejected the notion that the relationship is a status
giving rise to an advantageous relationship which will support an
action against the union on a tort theory,16 9 the orthodox contract
16773 Stat. 522-23, 29 U.S.C. §411(a)(4) (Supp. I, 1959). The fact
that federal courts have declined jurisdiction under the act over causes of
action arising out of the failure of the union to prosecute grievances on the ground
that the act extends only to improper disciplinary actions, Allen v. Teamsters Local
820, 185 F. Supp. 492 (D. N.J. 1960), only points up the need for uniform
treatment of the duty to represent employees and duties owing to union member-
ship. The union should not be permitted to accomplish what it could not do by
unlawful disciplinary action by failing to provide adequate representation. Thus, if
the national union is liable for the former, it should also be liable for the latter.
168 See cases cited note 132 suvra.
169 Orchard v. Tunney [1957] Can. Sup. Ct. 436, B D.L.R. 2d 273 (1957).
See Note, "Expulsion from a Trade Union as a Tort," 36 Can. B. Rev. 83 (1958).
Some American courts have denied recovery on either tort or contract theory
on the ground that an employee cannot sue his coprincipals, McClees v. Grand
Int'l Bhd. of Locomotive Engineers, 59 Ohio App. 477, 18 N.E. 2d 812 (1938);
Hromek v. Gemeinde, 238 Wis. 204, 298 N.W. 587 (1941); Howland v. Local
306, UAW-CIO, 331 Mich. 644, 50 N.W. 2d 186 (1951) (held union estopped to
plead this argument because it had argued in the trial court that the employee was
not a member of the union). However, a recent English case, Bonsor v. Musicians
Union [1956], A.C. 104, held a union member was not suing himself when he
brought suit against the union. See Wedderbum, "The Bonsor Affair: A Post-
Script," 20 Modem L. Rev. 105 (1957). Wedderbum's analysis characterizes
the Bonsor agency problem as threefold: first, whether a member of a union who
sues a union is suing himself among others; second, whether an agent of the
union is an agent of the plaintiff at least as much as of his fellow members; third,
whether, if the act be regarded as unauthorized, the other members can be
(footnote cQntinued on next page)
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and property theories170 cannot provide a cause of action against
the national union unless the breach by the local union is imputed
to the national union. To this extent even the orthodox theories
require that an agency relationship between the national union
and the member be found.
The national union is a fiduciary not only in theory but also
in practice. Many have review procedures; some grant the
member the right of appeal to an impartial tribunal. 7 1 These pro-
cedures have been reinforced by the safeguards against improper
disciplinary action in Title I of the Labor Management Reporting
and Disclosure Act. 172 Thus the national union can protect the
union member against both improper disciplinary action and
failure to provide adequate representation by the local union.
From the plaintiff's point of view, therefore, the national
union should be particularly concerned to see that its local unions
fairly represent employees and fulfill its obligations to union
members. Since the primary function for which a national is
formed is one of representation and its primary object is to
protect its members, the national union can hardly say that these
vital interests of its members are not its own. And on this basis
these duties can easily be read into the control-benefit approach
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
deemed to have ratified through their acquiescence in the acts of the union
officer. He then pursues the possible solutions to these problems suggested in
Bonsor and concludes that there is no way that recovery can be granted to
plaintiff without in fact resorting to some theory of entity. Wedderbum, supra
at 118. The Bonsor solution has had a salutary effect on the American decisions.
See Taxicab Drivers Local 889 v. Pittman, 322 P. 2d 159 (Okla. 1957),
where the court held that with respect to the first aspect of the Bonsor problem,
supra, the union was estopped to deny it was an entity because it had dealt in its
common name with both plaintiff and plaintiff's employer. With respect to the
second and third aspects of the problem the court adopted the Bonsor argument
that the union officials were not agents of plaintiff member because they were
not acting in his behalf.
The doctrine that a union member cannot sue his union because of his
status as coprincipal has been limited to rights not incidental to union member-
ship, Fray v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 9 Wis. 2d 631, 101 N.W. 2d 782
(1960), but converse reasoning was used in Di Maio v. Local 80-A, United
Packinghouse Workers, 29 N.J. Super. 341, 102 A. 2d 480 (L. 1954) to grant
recovery to a member of the union for libel, on the ground that the agency pro-
hibition was limited to rights owing to the union member as a member.
170 See Cox, "The Role of Law in Preserving Union Democracy," 72 Harv.
L. Rev. 609, 613-14 (1959).
171 Of these the most well-known are the Upholsterers Review Board, estab-
lished in May 1954, and the United Auto Workers Appeal Board, created on April
12, 1957 at the union's sixteenth convention. Wellington, "Union Democracy and
Fair Representation: Federal Responsibility in a Federal System," 67 Yale L.J.
1327, 1349-51 (1958).
172 73 Stat. 523, 29 U.S.C. §411(a) (5) (Supp. I, 1959).
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to the allocation of responsibility to the national union for the
conduct of its local and intermediate unions.
III. CONCLUSION
This attempt to clarify the responsibility of the national
union for the acts of its subordinate organizations yields three
conclusions. First, the national union may be held liable when
the facts will support an inference that it has consented to unlaw-
ful conduct. Consent may be expressed or it may be implied from
silence or acceptance of benefits when the union fails to dis-
charge a duty established by a prior course of national union
conduct, by an employer-union agreement, or by the unlawful
conduct of a local union which makes a substantial contribution
to a clear and definite union policy. Second, the national union
may be held liable for the unauthorized conduct of a local or
intermediate union whenever it can be shown to have actual
control over the local union or to have a right of control and a
clearly defined beneficial interest in the activities of the local.
Where the control-benefit analysis seems too vague to provide
concrete assistance, the court would do well to impose on the
national union no more than a duty to act. The imposition of
such a duty in the area of authorized conduct can provide a
useful halfway house in imposing responsibility on the national
union on the basis of respondeat superior because of the court's
discretion to determine whether the national union is under a
duty to act and whether it has discharged the duty. Finally, the
national union should be held responsible for the fair representa-
tion of employees and for the protection of the rights of union
members.
